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AN ANALYSIS OF MANAGED FLOATING EXCHANGE 
RATES: THE FRENCH FRANC, 1931-1938
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
This study will analyze the fluctuations in French 
franc-British pound exchange rate and the development 
of exchange stabilization funds during the period 1931- 
1938. The study of franc-pound exchange fluctuations 
during this period allows for an examination of the deter­
minants of exchange rate levels and changes under a system 
of managed or "dirty" floating exchange rates. Britain 
left the gold standard in September 1931 and in the period 
which followed until May 1938 the pound was free to float 
against the franc. During this period, both countries 
established stabilization funds for the purpose of inter­
vening in the foreign exchange market to influence the 
level of the franc-pound exchange rate. The British 
established the Exchange Equalization Account (BEEA) in 
1932 for the purpose of smoothing out unduly wide fluctu­
ations in the pound's exchange rate, but not to resist 
appreciations or depreciations resulting from fundamental
1
2economic forces. In October 1936 with the passage of 
the law officially devaluing (with respect to gold) the 
franc, the French created the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund (FESF). The expressed purpose of the FESF was to 
keep exchange fluctuations of the new national monetary 
unit within well defined limits.
While the franc remained tied to gold, the gold 
value of the pound after September 1931 was determined 
by the market forces of supply and demand. Thus the 
pound was not tied to gold and therefore the franc-pound 
exchange rate fluctuated according to market forces, 
subject to the activities of the BEEA and FESF.
Focus of the Study
Against this historical background, attention will 
be paid to (a) an analysis of the fluctuations in the 
franc-pound exchange rate from September 1931 through 
April 1938 including the influence on this exchange rate 
of fundamental economic forces and the intervention in 
the exchange market by the BEEA and the FESF, (b) an 
investigation into the question of competitive depreci­
ation which may or may not have resulted from the activi­
ties of the two stabilization funds, and (c) a study of 
the effects of the franc-pound exchange rate on trade
between France and the United Kingdom and arising out of
the investigation of these three factors, an answer to 
the following questions:
31. What was the effect on the monthly average 
franc-pound exchange rate of the following;
a. the magnitude of fundamental economic 
variables in France and the United Kingdom 
such as price levels, real income levels, 
and nominal money stocks
b. interest rate differentials
c. seasonal and trend effects
d. intervention by the BEEA and FESF
e. psychological forces arising out of non-
quantifiable economic, political or social 
events such as the Paris riots in 1934 
and the "flight from the franc" in 1935- 
1936.
2. Did either the BEEA or FESF act to manipulate 
the exchange rate to gaii^ an advantage in inter­
national trade, i.e. do their activities support 
the commonly accepted notion that this was a 
period of competitive depreciations?
3. Does the evidence from this period suggest that 
the export surplus of France and the United 
Kingdom was significantly influenced by the 
franc-pound exchange rate and relative price 
levels in the two countries as suggested by 
international trade theory?
4Reasons for Making this Study
On August 15, 1971, President Nixon officially broke 
the tie between the dollar and gold and thus destroyed the 
foundation for the adjustable peg international exchange 
rate system adopted by the member nations of the Inter­
national Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
in 1944. For most of the period since, currencies have 
been allowed to "float" relative to each other and exchange 
rates have more or less been determined by market forces. 
There is strong evidence that some exchange rates, notably 
the yen-dollar, franc-dollar and mark-dollar, have been 
subject to manipulation by official sources. This has 
given rise to the description of the recent period in 
the foreign exchange markets as a period of "dirty" floats.
However one chooses to describe the present inter­
national exchange rate system, it is in marked contrast 
to the previous adjustable peg system. Accordingly, 
there is much discussion about the viability of a floating 
exchange rate system and a clamor by many for a quick 
return to some variant of the fixed exchange rate system. 
The debate over alternative exchange rate systems has a 
lengthy history, yet very little empirical evidence is 
available for those responsible for making the choice 
of systems.
The major purpose of this study is not to answer 
directly the question of which is the better exchange
5rate system, freely foating, managed floating or some 
variation of fixed rates. Instead, this study seeks to 
provide a careful analysis of a period during which exchange 
rates floated subject to official intervention in the 
market. It is hoped that this study will stand with the 
growing body of literature which seeks to provide more 
than just casual evidence regarding periods when exchange 
rates were neither fixed nor subject to adjustable "bands." 
The premise of this study is that when historical experi­
ence is subjected to careful analysis, it can be a source 
of useful information to decision makers faced with the 
problem of constructing a new monetary system.
An investigation of the fluctuations in the franc- 
pound exchange rate during the 1930's is of major interest 
for the following reasons :
1. The three major currencies of the world during 
this period were the dollar, the franc and the 
pound. During much of the period, the dollar- 
franc rate was fixed but the dollar-pound and the 
franc-pound rates both floated, subject to some 
official management. Managed floats are a 
possibility and in some cases a reality in 
today's international monetary system, yet 
evidence about similar historical episodes is 
scarce. A study of the dollar-pound exchange 
rate during the 1930's has recently been made
6and is referred to in a later section. On the 
other hand, no examination of the franc-pound 
rate has been undertaken and this would appear 
to be the more important in terms of the lessons 
to be learned. Since international trade had a 
much more pervasive influence on the French 
economy than the American economy during this 
period, exchange rate levels presumably would 
have had a more distinct impact on such real 
variables as the export surplus, employment, 
production and income.
2. The period under investigation is similar to 
today in that both episodes involve major inter­
national disruption. During the 1930's, the 
world was in the throes of a major economic 
depression, while today price inflation is 
present in every major non-communist industrial 
nation. The lessons learned from the experiences 
of the 1930's should be valuable today.
3. Of a more academic interest is the question 
regarding "competitive devaluation" or "competi­
tive depreciation." Partly because many countries 
established stabilization funds during this 
period, and partly because there was a series
of devaluations and continuing depreciations 
during the period, it is commonly argued that
7the 1930's was nothing but a series of competi­
tive devaluations. To my knowledge, only one 
other study has attempted to analyze empirically 
the roles of any of the stabilization funds, 
and no study has been made to determine the roles 
and effects of the BEEA and FESF on the franc- 
pound exchange rate. This study attempts to 
assess the validity of the claim regarding 
competitive devaluations by careful analysis 
of intervention by the two funds.
4. During the 1930's, French trade deteriorated
and the nation remained mired in the trough of 
the depression long after recovery had begun in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. To 
my knowledge, no one has attempted to empirically 
analyze the relationship between the level of 
export surplus and the level of the franc-pound 
exchange rate together with the relative price 
levels in France and the United Kingdom. This 
study attempts to show that the exchange rate 
and relative prices had a significant effect on 
the level of the French export surplus and there­
fore on the level of production and employment 
in France.
8Outline of the Study 
The study will proceed as follows:
Chapter II will present a brief discussion of the 
events leading to the demise of the gold standard and the 
development and operation of the exchange stabilization 
funds. An analysis of the question of competitive depreci­
ations concludes the chapter.
Chapters III and IV present an analysis of the franc- 
pound exchange rate from 1931 through 1938. In Chapter III, 
a theoretical model is developed for analyzing fluctuations 
in the exchange rate. Chapter IV is divided into three 
sections: First a discussion of the data used in the
analysis is presented; a second section provides results 
of the estimates obtained through econometric analysis 
as well as comments on these results. Finally, a third 
section provides a comparison of the results of the present 
study with other studies of floating exchange rates during 
the 1930's and other periods.
Chapter V first considers the effect that the BEEA 
and FESF had on the terms of trade between France and the 
United Kingdom. A second section examines the relationship 
between the terms of trade and the export surplus of 
France with Britain.
Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions drawn regarding 
the questions raised in the study.
CHAPTER II
THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUNDS:
HISTORY AND OPERATION
The decade of the thirties saw profound changes in the 
international monetary system. As the decade began, the 
Western industrial world was experiencing a severe depression 
and the exchange rates between the major currencies were 
being maintained in a fixed relationship through the inter­
national gold standard.
The British pound sterling after being allowed to 
"float" from 1919-1925 was given a fixed value in terms of 
gold on May 13, 1925, with the passage of the Gold Standard 
Act.^ The United States dollar had returned to the full gold 
standard in 1919. By the end of 1925, thirty-five currencies 
had been stabilized on gold or were pegged to gold standara 
currencies. A notable exception was the French franc.
Largely because of the carry-over effects from World War I,
Two empirical studies of this period of floating 
exchange rates are John S. Hodgson, "An Analysis of Floating 
Exchange Rates: The Dollar-Sterling Rate, 1919-1925,"
The Southern Economic Journal (October 1972), 249-57, and 
Lloyd B. Thomas, "Behavior of Flexible Exchange Rates: 
Additional Tests from the Post War I Episode," The Southern 
Economic Journal (October 1973), 167-82.
10
France experienced a rather severe inflation during the 
early 1920's. From 1922 through 1926, the franc exhibited 
extreme instability relative to the pound and the d o l l a r . ^  
From the end of 1926 until June 1928, the franc was stabil­
ized de facto by official dealings of the Bank of France 
in the foreign exchange market. The value of the franc 
was fixed in terms of gold on June 25, 1928.
Before the end of the 1930's each of these currencies-- 
the dollar, pound, and franc--had left the gold standard 
either temporarily or permanently and a new type of inter­
national monetary system was in operation: a system of
managed floating exchange rates.
Exchange Stabilization Funds 
Each country which left the gold standard and proceeded 
to establish an official organization for the purpose of 
intervening in the exchange market had a somewhat different 
list of reasons for so doing. In general, however, it was 
agreed that a continuation of the gold standard was incon­
sistent with viable domestic economic policies for dealing 
with the problems of falling incomes, production, and
O
The franc depreciated suddenly from a high of 9.23 
cents in April 1922 to a low of 3.49 cents on March 8 , 1924. 
After rising to 6.71 cents in April 1925, the franc depre­
ciated again to a low of 2.05 cents during July 1926.
Raymond Poincare, a fiscal conservative, formed a cabinet 
on July 22, 1926, and the franc began a slow appreciation 
to approximately 4.0 cents by December 1926. Leland B. 
Yeager, International Monetary Relations (New York: Harper 
and Row, l9é6), pp. 280-85.
11
employment. Adherence to the strict tenets of the inter­
national gold standard immobilized domestic monetary 
policy and it was felt that an expansion of the credit
O
base was a prerequisite to ending the depression. The 
immediate past experience with freely floating exchange 
rates had convinced many government leaders (and economists 
as well) that such a system was highly unstable and pro­
duced disruptive effects on trade and therefore on produc­
tion and employment.^ The managed exchange rate system of 
the thirties was thus born of apparent necessity and repre­
sented a compromise between the principle of national 
sovereignty over monetary policy and the principle of 
adaptation to the requirements of an international monetary 
system.
3
"Devaluation was felt to be necessary, and was used, 
chiefly as a means to obtain freedom of national action in 
combating depression, in maintaining or revising aggregate 
demand and employment at home. No country achieved recovery 
without some measure of monetary expansion." Ragnar Nurske, 
International Currency Experience (League of Nations, 1944), 
p. 130.
^For instance see arguments by Nurske, Currency, 
pp. 117, 118 and 211. Such assentations regarding the 
innate instability of freely fluctuating exchange rates 
are not supported by recent empirical studies of such epi­
sodes. Broad swings in the exchange rate tend to follow 
rather closely broad swings in macrovariables. See for 
instance Hodgson, Southern Economic Journal; Thomas,
Southern Economic Journal; John S. Hodgson, "An Analysis of 
Exchange Rate Behavior under a Managed Floating Regime," 
presented at the annual meetings of the Western Economics 
Convention, San Diego, California, June 1975; M. Hudgins 
and J. K. Whitaker, "The Exchange Equalization Account and 
Sterling: An Empirical Study of the Floating Pound of the
1930's" (unpublished manuscript. University of Virginia, 
1974); and Chapter IV of this study.
12
Individually, the British, American, and French 
exchange stabilization funds sought widely different goals 
and their organization and operations reflected these 
differences. Each of these funds was a "collection of 
assets segregated under a central control for the purpose 
of intervention in the exchange market to prevent undesirable 
fluctuations in exchange r a t e s . A  key to the differences 
in the funds lies in understanding how each defined "unde­
sirable fluctuations" in exchange rates.
The British Exchange Equalization Account 
Britain left the gold standard in September 1931^ 
basically because its position as a world banker was threat­
ened by adverse events on the European continent. Before 
devaluation, Britain was loaning to the rest of the world 
on long-term, but this was not being made possible by an 
export surplus. In fact, the British balance of trade had 
been in chronic deficit since 1924.^ The outflow of long­
term capital was being financed by a compensating inflow 
of short-term loans from the rest of the world. This put
^Nurske, Currency, p. 143, with emphasis added.
^While Britain was the first of the major industrial 
nations to devalue its currency in terms of gold, it was not 
the first country to abandon the gold standard. Seven 
other countries preceded her: Uruguay, Argentina, and
Brazil in 1929; Australia, New Zealand, and Venezuela in 
1930, and Mexico in 1931. Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 299,
^Milton Gilbert, Currency Depreciation (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 193971 Table 18, p. 44.
13
the British banking system (and therefore the pound) in a 
vulnerable position should a withdrawal of the short-term 
loans occur,
Q
Two events in the summer of 1931, the failure of the 
Danat Bank in Germany followed by the Macmillian report, 
stimulated the capital flight from the pound and the sub­
sequent devaluation. The Danat Bank suffered a run on its 
assets following the bankruptcy of one of its customers, the 
largest textile firm in Germany. The bank re-opened a 
month later, but operated under restrictions, among which 
was the immobilization of funds owed by Germans to foreign 
banks. This effectively froze L 70 million of British 
short-term claims against foreigners.^ The Committee on 
Finance and Industry then issued the Macmillian report 
which inopportunely called attention to the deficit in 
Britain's short-term capital a c c o u n t . S t e r l i n g  depreci­
ated to the gold export point and gold flowed out of the 
United Kingdom. The pound left the gold standard on 
September 21, 1931, in order to protect the London money 
market from a continued flight of funds.
O
Gilbert, Currency Depreciation, p. 296,
^Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 296.
^^Britain's short-term claims on foreigners amounted 
to L 153 million of which 270 million were frozen in 
Germany while short-term claims against Britain were in 
excess of L 400 million. Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 297
14
The pound was allowed to float free from any official 
intervention for a period of approximately seven months 
until on April 19, 1932, Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, established the British Exchange Equal­
ization Account (BEEA or Account) as part of the Finance 
Bill.^^ The explicit purpose of the BEEA according to 
Chamberlain was to;
. . . smooth out the variations in exchange caused 
by three sets of phenomena: (1) the seasonal
fluctuations; (2) the operations of speculators, 
which increase those seasonal fluctuations, and 
other fluctuations, too; and (3) this special flight 
of capital from other countries for the sake of 
finding a safer place to stop for a t i m e . 12
Harris cites British officials as "having steadfastly
declared that the establishment of the BEEA was to eliminate
unnecessary fluctuations in sterling and not to maintain it
at a level below that determined by fundamental forces.
Other sources attributed a larger set of goals to the
BEEA which included protection from liquidity changes
A. Brown, Jr., The International Gold Standard 
Reinterpreted 1914-1934 (New York: NBER, 1940), II, 115.
l^This statement attributed to Chamberlain in 1933 
appears in L. M. Humphrey, "The Exchange Equalization 
Account of Great Britain, 1932-1939: Exchange Operations,"
American Economic Review, XXXII (December 1942), 803.
1 O
Seymour E. Harris, Exchange Depreciation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1936), p . 402. The obvious 
problem for any fund with such objectives is how its 
managers are to distinguish between exchange rate movements 
caused by fundamental forces and those resulting from 
speculative forces.
15
produced by hot money f l o w s , s a f e g u a r d i n g  the British 
economy from the effects of imported deflation, accumulation 
of a large gold and foreign exchange reserve and stimulation 
of exports through a deliberate undervaluation of sterling. 
It was this last possibility which generated the majority 
of the controversy associated with stabilization accounts 
and led to claims that the 1930's constituted a period of 
competitive exchange depreciations.^^ One can conclude 
from these statements that a certain amount of disagreement 
existed with regard to the objectives pursued by the 
Account.
The method of operation by the BEEA is well documented
l^Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 238, and Charles P. 
Kindleberger, International Economics (4th ed.; Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1968), p. 354.
^^Paul Einzig, The History of Foreign Exchange, 
pp. 288-289.
^^Nurske, Currency, pp. 122-33; Gilbert, Currency 
Depreciation, ppT 1-4, 86-88, and 156; Harris, Exchange 
Depreciation, chap. i.
^^An investigation into the effects of the exchange 
market intervention by the BEEA (as well as the French 
Exchange Stabilization Fund) will be the subject of Chapter V 
of this study. The issue of competitive depreciation 
involving the BEEA and the American Stabilization Fund was 
the subject of an earlier study by Hudgins, who found no 
conclusive evidence that either the BEEA or the American 
Stabilization Fund engaged in competitive depreciation 
with regard to their intervention in the dollar-pound 
exchange market. M. Hudgins, "Currency Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations Under a System of Stabilization Funds: The
Case of the Pound-Dollar Rate, 1931-1938" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Virginia, 1973).
16
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elsewhere and therefore only a brief outline of its oper­
ation is included below. In order to maintain the exchange 
rate at the level desired by monetary authorities, the BEEA 
was requried to buy and sell foreign currencies and there­
fore influence supply and demand relationships in the 
foreign exchange markets. Effective intervention required
that the BEEA have the ability to buy or sell foreign
19exchange and that its activity be kept secret. At first
the objective of the BEEA was only to resist an unwanted
appreciation of the pound and its assets consisted only of
British Treasury bills. In order to permit the Account to
also mitigate a depreciation in the pound's value, it was
allowed to keep a reserve of foreign exchange and gold
(obtained by sales of sterling). The Account was thus not
constrained to furnish support for the pound at any publicly
announced level and could in fact act to increase or retard
20an appreciation or depreciation of the pound.
18
See for instance, Pumphrey, "Exchange Operations," 
pp. 804-06; Brown, Gold Standard, pp. 119-25; or Yeager, 
Monetary Relations, pp. 238-40. The following description 
draws heavily on these sources.
19For the most part, effective intervention did require 
secrecy. However, Pumphrey points out that on ". . . occa­
sions they deliberately operated in full view of the market." 
Usually the BEEA was only interested in keeping secret the 
extent rather that the fact of intervention. At times 
however, the managers felt that the greatest impact could 
be derived if it was actively and openly dealing in the 
exchange and on those occasions they would place orders 
directly with various exchange brokers in London, 
on
This was a "freedom" which distinguished the BEEA 
from the French Exchange Stabilization Fund.
17
While the BEEA was an integral part of the Bank of
England, its activités were not reported on a weekly basis
91as were those of other departments.
In order to resist an undesired appreciation of 
sterling, the BEEA would buy foreign exchange with sterling 
obtained from the sale of Treasury bills in the market.
The foreign exchange so obtained was converted to gold 
(to eliminate and exchange risk of holding exchange curren­
cies) which was sold to the Bank of England. The BEEA then 
had its choice of increasing its balances with the Bank, or 
re-investing in Treasury bills. When the managers chose to 
buy Treasury bills (as they usually did), these were bought 
"through the tap" in order that the public would not deduce
the extent of the BEEA's intervention in the foreign
9 9exchange market. If it was desired to resist a depreciation 
of sterling, the process was reversed. The operation of the 
BEEA could thus be considered identical to the effects of 
a gold import carried out under gold standard conditions by 
private arbitrage and offset by Bank of England open market 
operations. By selling or buying securities (Treasury bills)
21 A weekly reporting of its activities would have 
undermined its desire for secrecy of operation.
22Treasury bills bought "through the tap" were not 
purchased in the market, but directly from the Treasury. 
This increased the available funds of the Treasury and 
allowed them to reduce the amount of bills offered at 
the next tender.
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whenever it bought or sold foreign exchange, the Account
neutralized the expansionary or contractionary domestic
23monetary impact.
While it was impossible to determine the magnitude of 
intervention by the Account in the franc-pound exchange mar­
ket, reliable sources did report the Account's presence in 
that market. In its weekly accounts of activity in the 
foreign exchange markets. The Economist included reports of 
the intervention operations of both the BEEA and FESF.^^
25The American Stabilization Fund 
The United States left the gold standard in April 1933 
for very different reasons than Britain had in 1931. The 
primary objective was to allow for an inflation of United 
States prices to their 1926 level. It was the general 
opinion that a "reflation" of prices was necessary for 
economic recovery and that domestic policies to accomplish
23Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 238. The ability to 
neutralize the domestic monetary impact of its exchange 
market operations is a second feature which distinguished 
the BEEA from the French Exchange Stabilization Fund.
^^These accounts are presented in summary form in the 
appendix following this chapter. This information was also 
used to construct dummy variables to analyze the effects of 
intervention on the franc-pound exchange rate in Chapters 
III and IV and to determine the effects of intervention on 
the terms of trade between France and Britain in Chapter V.
25
This brief section on the departure of the United 
States from the gold standard and the subsequent formation 
of the American Stabilization Fund is presented only to 
provide contrast to the similar occurrences in Britain and 
France. No attempt is being made in this study to analyze 
the activity of the American Stabilization Fund.
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this reflation would be more effective if the dollar were 
9 A
depreciated. In addition, a set of secondary objectives
included: (1) an increase in exports and a decrease in
imports, (2) correct an adverse balance of payments
situation leading to deflation of prices, (3) prepare for
other expansionist policies by readjusting the balance of
payments situation so that deflationary pressure may not 
27arise.
The American Stabilization Fund established on April 
27, 1934 was created out of profits accruing from the 
devaluation of the dollar from $20.67 to $35.00 per ounce 
of gold on January 31, 1934. The expressed purpose of the 
American Fund was the stabilization of the dollar at home 
and abroad at $35.00 per ounce of gold. In Hudgin's 
empirical investigation, mentioned previously, no evidence 
was found that the American Stabilization Fund influenced
On October 22, 1933 Roosevelt stated that the policy 
of the U.S. Government "Has been to restore commodity price 
levels . . . "  (and to) "seek to establish and maintain a 
dollar which will not change its purchasing and debt paying 
power during the succeeding generation." " . . .  our dollar 
is now altogether too greatly influenced by the accidents of 
international trade, by the internal policies of other nations, 
and by political disturbances in other continents. Therefore 
the United States must take firmly in its own hands the 
control of the gold value of the dollar. This is necessary 
in order to prevent dollar disturbances from swinging us 
away from our ultimate goal, namely the continued recovery 
of our commodity prices." J. D. Paris, Monetary Policies of 
the United States: 1932-1938 (New York: Columbia University,
1938), pp. 22-23.
27
Gilbert, Currency Depreciation, p. 116.
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the dollar-pound exchange rate, but instead followed its
objective of keeping the dollar rigidly pegged to gold
2 8throughout the remainder of its existence.
Given this brief description of the American Stabili­
zation Fund, attention is now turned to circumstances 
leading to the development of the French Exchange Stabili­
zation Fund.
The French Attempt to Deflate Prices 
and the Popular Front
One cannot fail to be impressed with the tragedy which
befell France during the 1930's. Having stabilized the franc
in 1926 and joined the gold standard currency group of nations
in 1928, France experienced a substantial increase in her
export surplus and a concomitant inflow of gold. The federal
budget was in surplus in 1928, 1929, and early 1930 and
29allowed for a reduction in both taxes and the national debt.
It was commonly believed that the Poincare franc was the 
"strongest currency in the world" and further that France's 
apparent immunity from the depression occurring in the rest 
of the world was the result of the franc's strength. In 
addition, the prosperity of the period (1928-1930) was thought 
to depend largely on the maintenance of the gold standard.
28
Hudgins, "Currency Exchange Rate Fluctuations," p. 220
29
Martin Wolfe, The French Franc Between the Wars 1919- 
1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p p . 75-77.
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The tenacity of the French to remain on the gold standard 
long after the British pound had left gold and the United 
States had devalued the dollar became a major reason for 
the failure of the French economy after worldwide recovery 
began in early 1933.
According to many observers, the reason for the early
"immunity of the French economy from the depression and
the later inability to mobilize a recovery was to be found
in the Poincare franc.
The rise in world incomes during the international 
boom of the twenties enabled French exporters to 
boost their sales to unprecedented levels. By the 
end of the decade, therefore, an export-led boom 
had taken over from the reconstruction (from World 
War I) and the home market in feeding the expansion.
These favorable conditions were, however, to be 
short-lived. If the crisis struck France belatedly 
chiefly because of the undervaluation of the franc 
Poincare,when it did so, after the sterling crisis 
of the autumn of 1931, its effects were all the 
more severe. The franc became overvalued and 
French goods were now priced out of many markets 
at the very time when incomes had been cut and 
competition had become s h a r p e r . 30
Whereas the franc was generally acknowledged to have 
been undervalued vis-a-vis sterling and the dollar in 1928, 
the devaluation of the pound (1931) and dollar (1933) were
31excessive to the extent that the franc was left overvalued.
3D
Tom Kemp, The French Economy 1913-1939 (New York :
St. Martin's Press’^ 1972) , p"! WT. See also accounts by Wolfe, 
French Franc, chap. iii; Gilbert, Currency Depreciation, pp.
53, 86-83 ; and William H. Wynne, "The French Franc, June,
1928 - February, 1937," Journal of Political Economy, XLV, 
(August, 1937), 484-85.
31
Gilbert, Currency Depreciation, pp. 53, 86, 88 and 
Wolfe, French Franc, p. 106.
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Using a purchasing power parity calculation The Economist re­
ported that in 1935 the franc was overvalued by twenty-six per
32cent against the pound and thirty per cent against the dollar. 
Adherence to the gold standard was not only a problem in it­
self, but also contributed to a ilarger problem of the French 
economy--falling incomes, production and employment. Recogniz­
ing that French prices were out of line with those of its 
trading partners, a downward adjustment was desirable. This 
could be accomplished through either devaluation or domestic
O O
price deflation. The French initially chose deflation.
^^The Economist, May 30, 1936, p. 492.
33"To all except the few advocates of a French 
devaluation, the solution to this problem was not to 
drive down the exchange value of the franc, but to 
drive down wages and prices within France to the point 
where French goods could compete again on international 
markets." Wolfe, French Franc, p. 106. Yeager comments 
on this policy of forced deflation : "Some economic
logic can actually be claimed for Laval's program. If 
defending the exchange rate rules out monetary expansion 
to promote recovery from depression--if domestic purchasing 
power must not be expanded by increasing the number of 
francs in circulation--then the next best approach is 
to expand total real purchasing power by raising the 
purchasing power of each existing franc." Yeager, Monetary 
Relations, p. 315. As Yeager points out, the theoretical 
argument is of course acceptable. Practically, however, 
the task of deflating wages and prices by 30 per cent 
or more in an industrial country poses a monumental 
problem. Since prices and wages were also falling 
in the rest of the world, this compounded the French 
task.
23
A series of French Governments from 1933 to 1935 pursued
policies aimed at deliberate deflation. The most notable of
these was the government headed by Pierre Laval from June
to October 1935.
Granted plenary powers by the legislature, the Laval
government sought to force a deflation through "decree-laws”
which included: (1) a decrease of ten per cent on wages
and prices under the control of the government, (2) a ten
per cent cut in governmental administrative budgets, (3) a
ten per cent reduction in the -nterest paid on government
g o n d s . The French attempt at deflation failed to the
extent that the prices of industrial materials failed to
fall. This was largely the result of trade restriction
policies which protected French industry from lower priced
35foreign commodities.
^^Wjmne, "The French Franc," pp. 499-501.
35If French exports were to sell at competitive prices 
without a devaluation of the franc, then prices of industrial 
materials had to fall first. Imports came largely from dollar 
and sterling areas, and as their world market prices fell, 
French tariffs were raised and French import quotas were 
extended obviating a fall in the prices of imported industrial 
materials. Wolfe, French Franc, p. 124. This is not the only 
seeming contradiction of the Laval deflationary policies: 
"Under M. Laval, France was at one and the same time deflating 
and reflating. In order to defend the franc, the government 
cut budget expenditure; while, concurrently, it jeopardized 
the franc's parity by incurring heavy extra-budgetary charges 
for armaments and public works. And, when loans to cover 
these charges were not forthcoming in sufficient amount from 
the public, the government found it necessary to have recourse 
to a form of borrowing from the Bank perilously akin to overt 
inflation." Wynne, "The French Franc," pp. 499-501.
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The Popular Front Government of Leon Blum, advocating 
sweeping social reforms, followed Laval into office. While 
in most ways, Blum was the polar opposite of Laval, he came 
into office reluctant to devalue, having made such a promise 
in his campaign. Blum hoped to remain on the gold standard 
and reflate the economy through a series of government 
programs which would increase wages and hopefully purchasing 
power and employment.
Throughout the Blum and earlier administrations, the
Bank of France had manipulated discount rates in an attempt
to attract short-term capital and bolster the franc. This
policy also failed as speculators began to regard increases
in the discount rate as signals of impending crisis and acted
37to depress the franc on the exchanges.
Like its predecessors, the Blum Government failed to 
bring French prices into line with foreign prices while 
remaining on the gold standard, and on September 26, 1936
O Ç.
The Popular Front Program consisted of: (1) the
enforcement of a system of collective bargaining, annual 
holidays with pay and the forty-hour (maximum) week,
(2) the nationalization of industries making war material,
(3) the authorization of a large program of public works,
(4) the enforcement of a price control system, the reorgani­
zation of the coal industry and the creation of a national 
monopoly for the distribution of wheat. H. V. Hodson,
Slump and Recovery 1929-1937 (London: Oxford University Press,
1938; , p . 407. At a future date Blum intended to "enact a 
scheme of old-age pensions, further measures to deal with 
unemployemnt, and tax reform at the expense of inherited 
wealth." Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 316.
37
See for example accounts by Yeager, Monetary Relations, 
p. 317; Wynn, "The French Franc," p. 508; and Wolfe, French 
Franc, p. 117.
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sought escape from the continuing stagnation through the 
devaluation of the franc. In summary, it was the failure to 
reduce prices through deflation and the failure of the social 
reforms of Leon Blum which left the French with no choice but 
to devalue the franc.
The French Exchange Stabilization Fund 
The law officially devaluing the franc was passed on 
October 1, 1936. The new "elastic franc" was still defined 
as a gold currency, its value to be fixed at "some future 
date by the Council of Ministers at a figure between forty-
O Q
nine and forty-three milligrams of gold . . . "  In addition 
the Devaluation Law provided for the establishment of the 
French Exchange Stabilization Fund (FESF or Fund) with ten 
billion francs (obtained by revalorizing the Bank of France's 
gold holdings) and charged the Fund with maintaining the 
exchange value of the franc inside the new legal limits.
Unlike the previous devaluations by the British and 
Americans, the action by the French was undertaken in a 
spirit of close cooperation. In fact, one of the fears of 
the French was that a devaluation of the franc might serve 
only to encourage competitive devaluations by the United
38
Wolfe, French Franc, p. 146. This allowed a devalu­
ation of between 25.2 and 34.4 per cent. When the exchange 
markets reopened, the franc had been devalued approximately 
30 per-cent with respect to the dollar and 28 per cent 
with respect to sterling.
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States and Britain. The fact that the Blum Government worked 
closely with the United States and Britain is evidenced by 
the simultaneous announcement of the franc's devaluation and 
the "Tripartite Monetary Pact" on September 26, 1936. The 
"Pact" originally included France, Britain and the United 
States as members and contained assurances that the British 
and the United States would not respond competitively to the 
devaluation of the franc. "Supplements to the original 
declaration provided for convertibility of the franc, pound, 
and dollar at fixed prices prevailing from day to day, thus 
creating a sort of new gold bloc on a twenty-four hour 
basis."39
The FESF was in many ways a copy of the BEEA. It 
operated in the foreign exchange market as a subsidiary of 
the central bank to oppose undesirable fluctuations in the 
value of the national currency. Like its British counter­
part, the Fund maintained secrecy in its operations to 
"minimize speculative movements of short-term capital which 
might result from, as well as induce, fluctuations in exchange 
rates."40
A basic difference between the accounts was found 
in their ability to offset the impact of foreign exchange
39
Yeager, Monetary Relations, p. 318. By late 1936, 
Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland had also joined in the 
agreement.
40Robert Solomon, "The French Exchange Stabilization," 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1950, p. 35.
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market activities on domestic credit conditions. As explained 
previously, the BEEA, through the simultaneous purchase or 
sale of Treasury bills, could insulate the domestic money 
market from external influences. When the FESF acted to 
resist a depreciation of the franc, it sold gold abroad to 
acquire dollars or pounds which it then sold on the foreign 
exchange market (to buy francs) in France. If the Fund's 
gold reserves became exhausted, it was forced to buy more 
gold from the Bank of F r a n c e . T h e  franc assets acquired 
by the FESF when it sold foreign exchange to the public were 
placed on idle deposit at the Bank of France. Thus an out­
flow of capital caused a transfer of reserves and notes from 
banks and individuals to the Fund's idle deposit account and 
tended to produce monetary stringency identical to that 
experienced under the formal gold standard.
Another major difference between the two stabilization 
agencies involved the nature of their intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. The intervention of the BEEA was 
always discretionary, but because of the Devaluation Law of 
1936, the FESF was forced to support the franc at arbitrary
Especially during the first ten months after the 
devaluation of the franc, the Fund was forced to maintain 
the franc through gold sales. In so doing, the FESF acted 
as an intermediary through which the Bank of France sold gold 
to support the exchange rate and in effect, France remained 
on the gold standard. Robert Solomon, "French Exchange 
Stabilization," p. 37.
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l e v e l s . 42 The Fund exhausted its original gold allotment 
plus two subsequent borrowings from the Bank of France 
attempting to keep the franc within the bands set in 1936.
A decree was therefore passed on June 30, 1937, which 
divorced the franc from gold and allowed the FESF to inter­
vene in the exchange market on a discretionary rather than 
a mandatory b a s i s . 43
Basically, the so-called "floating franc" floated 
downwards. The devaluation of June 30, 1937, did not 
inspire confidence in the new franc and the Fund intervened 
not to resist a further depreciation, but only to smooth 
out fluctuations around a downward trend.
The FESF also had more trouble maintaining secrecy in 
its operations than did the BEEA. During the fall of 1937, 
the gold transactions conducted between the Fund and the 
Bank of France were reflected in the Bank's weekly balance 
sheet. Adverse movements were thus public knowledge and 
tended to encourage capital flight and speculation. In 
April 1938 a law which created the "sterling franc" also 
authorized the FESF to :
Alternatively, one could say that until the decree 
of June 1937, the FESF attempted to resist trend while 
the BEEA did not.
43gince it was no longer attached to a specific amount 
of gold, the new "Bonnet franc" was also known as the 
"floating franc." The FESF had its powers and privileges 
reaffirmed, but was only committed to a "mobile defense 
of the franc." Wolfe, French Franc, p. 175.
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borrow francs from the Treasury (instead of selling 
gold to obtain francs) and also to sell gold to the 
Fonds de Southien des Rentes (instead of the Bank). 
a Government agency charged with the responsibility 
of supporting the prices of Government securities. 44
Thus the exchange market activities of the FESF could no
longer be inferred from gold movements between the Fund and
the Bank.
The creation of the "sterling franc" is the event which 
marks the end of the historical period under study. The 
franc was pegged to the pound at a rate of about 179 francs 
per pound sterling on May 4, 1938, and the long depreciation 
of the franc was ended.
In the appendix which follows this chapter, the activity 
of the FESF is presented as it was documented in weekly 
accounts in The Economist.
The Question of Competitive Depreciation
The fact that exchange stabilization funds had the 
ability to influence the level of the exchange rates created 
suspicions that they were engaged in acts of competitive 
depreciation. Such accusations were most frequently made 
against the BEEA.
Generally, a competitive depreciation may be said to 
occur when country F responds to a depreciation of country
^^Solomon, "French Exchange Stabilization," p. 37.
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U. K.'s currency by depreciation of its own currency.
If such was the nature of activity by the BEEA and FESF, then 
one would expect that accounts of their interventions in the 
exchange market would show that when one was trying to 
depreciate the franc-pound rate, the other was attempting to 
appreciate the rate. An examination of the weekly accounts 
in The Economist shown in Appendix II does not reveal a single 
act which could be labeled "competitive" according to this 
criteria.
The weekly accounts summarized in Appendix II show that 
in the vast majority of the cases, the two funds did not even 
operate in the market at the same time. This would support 
a claim that the FESF and BEEA were operating with the same 
implicit goals in the exchange market. To add support to 
this claim, on the six occasions reported when both agencies
were active at the same time, they always worked to the same
1 tl 
47
ends. On one occasion, it was reported hat the BEEA
operated on behalf of the Bank of France.
For instance, assume that Britain was letting the 
pound float and the BEEA intervened in the exchange market 
to influence sterling fluctuations against the French franc. 
If as a result, the FESF feels compelled to intervene to 
offset the intervention by the BEEA, then the stabilization 
funds of the two countries are engaging in competitive 
exchange intervention.
^^See summary comments in Appendix II for the following 
dates: May 26, 1934; August 11, 1934; March 14, 1936; April
11, 1936; April 10, 1937 and September 18, 1937.
^^The Economist, July 11, 1936, p. 69.
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Thus rather than supporting claims that the 'thirties 
were a series of competitive depreciations, the evidence 
indicates that at least the BEEA and FESF were engaged in 
"cooperative exchange intervention". However, the fact that 
the funds were not competing with each other does not imply 
that the activities of one fund did not bring about undesired 
repercussions on the other country. Chapter V of this study 
presents evidence that the intervention activity was in fact 
disruptive to trade between France and the United Kingdom.
Chapter Summary 
While both Britain and France abandoned the gold standard 
and established stabilization funds to facilitate managed 
floating exchange rates, many differences were noted surround­
ing these similar events:
Abandonment of the gold standard. - Britain left the gold 
standard to protect the London money market while France left 
because deflationist policies had failed to bring French 
prices into line with her trading partners and the social 
reforms of the Blum Government failed to revive the stagnating 
economy.
Goals of the stabilization funds. - Ostensibly, the BEEA's 
goal was only to smooth out undue fluctuations in the value 
of sterling and not to resist fundamental forces. Other 
possible goals of the Account were noted. Until the summer 
of 1937, the goal of the FESF was basically to resist trend 
and maintain a fixed value of the franc relative to gold.
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After June 1937, the Fund operated in much the same way 
as the Account.
Rather than supporting the claim of competitive 
exchange interventions, the evidence suggests that a 
cooperative relationship existed between the BEEA and 
FESF.
In the next two chapters an anlysis of the franc- 
pound exchange rate between September 1931 and April 1938 
will be made. As a part of this analysis, the impact of 
the activity of both the BEEA and FESF on the level of 
the franc-pound rate will be determined.
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Appendix II
Summarized below is information reported by The Economist 
regarding the activity of the BEEA and FESF in the franc- 
pound exchange market. For the majority of cases, these 
observations were found in the "Foreign Exchanges" sub­
section of the major section entitled "Money and Banking." 
Except where quotation marks are used, the comments below 
are paraphrased and condensed versions of the original text. 
The data given is the date of issue.
Date Comment
7-30-32 The Bank of France sold francs for pounds
to support a sagging pound.
9-17-32 The pound weakened and French authorities
intervened, buying pounds to slow appreci­
ation of the franc.
3-11-33 British Control bought francs to keep the
pound from appreciating too rapidly.
5-6-33 The BEEA sold francs to drive the exchange 
rate from 83 3/8 to 84 3/4 (francs per pound).
6-10-33 The BEEA bought francs to help move the 
exchange rate from 86 1/8 to 85 5/8.
6-17-33 There was occasional intervention by the
BEEA to buy pounds.
6-24-33 "The Paris rate has been inclined to weakness 
and at times intervention by the British 
Control has again been thought advisable."
7-15-33 The BEEA sold francs.
7-22-33 British Control sold francs.
7-29-33 "French francs have also continued to appreci­
ate against sterling and frequent sales of 
francs have been made this week by the British 
Control."
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Date Comment
8-5-33 The BEEA sold francs.
9-2-33 Rumors of further inflation in the U.S.
sparked a demand for francs. The BEEA let 
the franc-pound rate move freely.
9-9-33 The knowledge that the BEEA stood ready to
sell francs proved sufficient to deter specu­
lators. British Control is and has been 
inactive for several weeks now.
10-21-33 A revival of confidence in the dollar has
caused a return of funds to New York from 
Paris via London. As a result the franc 
depreciated against the pound and the BEEA 
intervened on several occasions to buy francs
10-28-33 Rumors are that in the absence of BEEA inter­
vention, the Bank of France bought francs
to support the rate.
11-18-33 As U.S. funds were transferred to London
via Paris, the pound appreciated and the 
BEEA bought francs.
11-25-33 There was continuous support (buying francs) 
by the BEEA. Losses of gold and devisen
by the Bank of France and political and 
budgetary difficulties in France are seen 
as problems.
12-2-33 The BEEA bought francs but was less active
than in the previous week.
12-9-33 The franc was firmer "with practically no
official intervention in London."
12-16-33 "No support of the franc by British Control
has lately been necessary. . . ."
1-27-34 The BEEA is inactive, but the exchange rate
is being supported by the Bank of France 
(buying francs) at 79 1/2.
3-10-34 The BEAA sold francs to keep the rate from
moving below 79
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Date Comment
5-12-34 The BEEA intervened at 77 1/4 by selling
francs. Indications are that some official 
support of sterling has been necessary for 
the last few weeks.
5-19-34 The BEEA made "small sales of francs from
time to time."
5-26-34 The franc appreciated in spite of inter­
vention by both the BEEA and the Bank of 
France. Chief resistance to an appreciation 
will come from the French since the attitude 
of the BEEA is not to check a genuine fall. 
France is concerned with any increase in 
the undervaluation of the pound.
6-2-34 The BEEA continued to sell francs (although 
not heavily) to keep the pound from depreci­
ating as confidence in French finances 
increased.
6-9-34 The BEEA continued to sell francs.
6-16-34 The BEEA sold francs to support the pound.
6-30-34 The BEEA sold francs all week.
7-7-34 The BEEA sold francs and the Bank of France
continues to gain gold.
7-14-34 The BEEA only intervened once this week to
sell francs.
7-28-34 On two occasions this week, British Control 
sold francs.
8-4-34 The BEEA sold francs consistently but allowed 
the dollar to go and the franc depreciated 
against the dollar.
8-11-34 Both the BEEA and the Bank of France sold
francs this week.
8-18-34 The BEEA sold francs.
8-25-34 "There has been a persistent demand for
francs, and as the British Control has been 
less active, the spot rate has fallen to 
Frs. 76 1/32."
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Date Comment
9-8-34 The BEEA sold francs to stop the depreciation
of the pound.
9-15-34 Sterling showed strength and allowed the
BEEA to sell pounds (buy francs).
9-29-34 There were small sales of francs by the 
British Control.
10-13-34 Early in the week the BEEA bought francs in
response to pressure from the Marseilles 
assassinations. Later the BEEA sold francs 
as sterling weakened.
11-10-34 "British Control was buying Frs. at 76 1/16."
11-24-34 The BEEA sold francs as the pound weakened.
12-8-34 As the exchange rate dipped to Frs. 75, the
BEEA intervened to sell francs.
12-22-34 The BEEA "bought a few francs" as the franc
weakened.
1-5-35 The BEEA sold francs as demand for francs
was high due to expectations for a steady
return of investment funds to France.
2-2-35 There were strong rumors that the Bank of 
France sold francs to steady the exchange 
rate.
2-16-35 The BEEA sold francs as a continual selling
of British securities created a supply of 
pounds.
2-23-35 The BEEA sold francs occasionally.
3-9-35 British Control "sold francs on a fairly 
large scale."
3-16-35 "Very little intervention by the British
Control was noticeable last week."
3-23-35 "The British Control is believed to have
sold a few francs from time to time."
5-4-35 British Control bought francs as spot sterling
was weak.
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Date Comment
5-18-35 "Once or twice the British Control intervened
and bought small quantities of francs."
5-25-35 "This week the French franc has been subject 
to heavy and continuous pressure in an active 
market. The British Control bought francs 
fairly frequently and must have well replen­
ished its stocks of devisen. . . .  It seems 
that the weakness of the franc is due to a 
definite flight of funds from France and not 
to speculation.
6-1-35 The BEEA intervened heavily to buy francs. 
Estimates are that since the present weakness 
of the franc began the Account has accumulated 
L 40 million of gold and foreign exchange.
6-8-35 "During the week, purchases of spot francs
by the British Control have been frequent, 
but limited in magnitude."
6-15-35 The formation of a new Government under
M. Laval caused the franc to strengthen and 
it was rumored that the BEEA sold a few francs.
7-6-35 As spéculatives forward sales of gold curren­
cies made last April are falling due, gold 
currencies were being bought spot to cover.
The franc strengthened and the BEEA "sold
a few francs to steady the rate."
7-27-35 "Spot French francs began to weaken, but
as soon as the rate touched Frs. 75 the 
British Control intervened (to buy francs) 
and held the rate."
8-3-35 Early in the week the BEEA bought francs,
but later sold as the rate improved. By 
the week's end, there was no intervention.
8-10-35 The British Control bought francs.
8-17-35 The BEEA has been buying spot francs at
75 1/32 and using these to buy gold in Paris. 
But the London price of gold has fallen low 
enough to make it profitable to buy gold in
 Londp,n,fpr resale in Paris. The gold bought
by British Control probably came from London.
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8-31-35 British Control continued to buy francs 
to support the rate.
9-28-35 "The British Control intervened heavily
in Paris in support of sterling at the end 
of last week, and it is unofficially believed 
in London that it sold as much as Frs. 300 
million."
10-5-35 In order to indirectly support sterling
against the dollar, " . . .  British Control 
sold French francs for pounds in large quan­
tities. . . .  In effect gold is going from 
the British Control's holdings via Paris
to New York."
10-12-35 The BEEA was selling francs at about the
rate of 250 million a day as the demand 
for dollars persisted.
11-9-35 British Control had to buy a few francs
in order to give support as the franc weakened.
11-23-35 The BEEA bought francs as the spot rate
weakened and the discount on the 90 day 
franc rose to over 14% per year.
12-28-35 The British Control bought francs.
1-18-36 British Control supported the franc due
to adverse political events in Paris.
1-25-36 With the fall of the Laval Government eminent, 
francs were sold heavily against sterling
and BEEA bought francs heavily. Upon Laval's 
resignation, the francs strengthened, but 
later weakened and the Account again bought 
francs heavily.
2-8-36 The Account bought francs to slow the depreci­
ation of the franc against the pound.
3-14-36 "Both London control and French authorities 
have been buying Frs. to stabilize the rate 
artificially at just under Frs. 75."
3-28-36 Due to renewed French borrowing, the franc
weakened and was supported by the British 
Account at succeedingly higher franc-pound 
rates.
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4-4-36 British Control intervened heavily to support
the franc. Rumors were that the American 
Control was offering dollars against the 
franc.
4-11-36 The BEEA and the Bank of France continued
to support the franc.
4-18-36 Both British Control and the Bank of France
continued to support the franc. Gold losses 
last week by the Bank were announced to be 
950 million franc.
4-25-36 There was only mild support by the British 
Account as the franc strengthened.
5-9-36 The BEEA bought francs heavily but could 
not hold the franc from rising to 7 5 1/2.
5-16-35 There was little intervention by the BEEA
to buy francs.
5-23-36 Only a small amount of francs were bought
by the British Control.
5-30-36 Only a small amount of francs were bought 
by the BEEA.
6-6-36 The BEEA intervened intermittently to buy 
francs as the franc weakened and in two 
days (June 2 and 3) the Bank of France lost 
350 million Frs. in gold.
6-13-36 The BEEA continued to support the rate by
purchasing francs.
6-20-36 British Control gave heavy support (bought
francs) to the exchange rate.
6-27-36 The franc strengthened as Minister of Finance, 
M. Vincent Auriol stated that the French 
Government rejected devaluation as a remedy 
for its problems. The Account may have sold
a few francs.
7-4-36 The Account sold francs to check too rapid 
an appreciation as the franc strengthened.
The Bank continues to gain gold.
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7-11-36 The BEEA sold francs in behalf of the Bank
of France as the franc continued to strengthen. 
The Bank continues to gain gold.
8-1-36 The Account is rumored to have supported
the franc (bought francs) as it weakened.
8-8-36 The BEEA bought francs intermittently.
8-15-36 "No Account intervention has been necessary."
8-22-36 After gaining gold for several weeks, the 
Bank of France lost gold. There was not 
Account support but French authorities did 
sell dollars to support the franc.
9-12-36 The franc weakened and required persistent
support by the Account. The Account has 
held the franc at certain arbitrary levels 
for a time and "then let it go gently."
9-19-36 The Account continued to support the franc
and then let it go slowly instead of trying 
to maintain a fixed level, giving rise to 
a criticism of its tactics.
9-26-36 Spot francs were bought consistently by
the Account as devaluation appeared eminent. 
France failed to float a bond issue and ". . .
no one believes that a 5 or even a 7 percent 
Bank rate will be the smallest use in saving 
the franc."
10-17-36 The French Fund has been selling francs for 
pounds.
10-24-36 The franc weakened and required support
by the FESF which bought francs.
10-31-35 The franc continued to weaken, but there
was no official support.
11-7-36 While the franc weakened, there was no spot
intervention by the BEEA or FESF although
the French Fund did operate in the forward
market, selling francs.
11-14-36 On a rumor that the franc would be allowed
to slide to the bottom limit allowed by
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by the recent devaluation, the franc weakened 
significantly and the FESF bought francs.
11-21-36 The rate is being supported at a strict level
of Frs. 105.15 by the franc purchases of 
the French Fund.
11-28-36 The FESF bought francs.
12-5-36 The spot franc continues to be supported
by the purchases of the Fund.
12-12-36 The franc strengthened and required only
mild support by the FESF.
12-19-36 Only mild support of the franc was required
by the FESF.
1-2-37 The FESF is supporting the spot franc (buying
francs).
1-9-37 The Fund is intervening (buying francs)
in both the spot and forward markets.
1-16-37 Due to pressures resulting from an expected
further devaluation, the Fund continues 
to buy spot francs to support the rate.
1-23-37 The Fund continues to buy francs to peg the
rate at Frs. 105.15 although rumors are 
strong that it will depreciate to Frs. 112 
(its equivalent at 43 mg. of gold--the lower 
statutory limit).
1-30-37 The French Bank rate was raised from 2 to 4 
percent after heavy pressure on the franc 
earlier in the week. This did nothing to 
ease the selling pressure. The Fund continued 
to buy francs to support the rate at 105.15.
2-6-37 The Fund continues to buy francs to hold
the rate around 105.15, but the peg is removed 
from time to time to allow M. Cariquel (in 
charge of FESF) to squeeze the bear 
speculators.
3-6-37 "Rumours of depreciation have caused heavy 
selling of francs . . .  to the extent of 
requiring occasional official intervention 
(by the FESF)."
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3-13-37 The franc was unpegged and fell to 108 1/4,
but soon strengthened to 106 1/2. When the 
rate fell below 107 1/4, the Fund bought 
sterling to prevent too rapid an appreciation 
of the franc.
3-20-37 Despite support by the Fund (buying francs)
the spot rate rose to 106.65.
3-27-37 The French Fund sold francs to support the 
rate in response to a moderate increase in 
demand for francs.
4-3-37 The Fund sold francs to keep the rate at 
106.32 as francs were in demand to pay the 
French Defense Loan. After the loan was 
made, the Fund bought francs as the rate 
rose to 106.37.
4-10-37 Both the BEEA and FESF bought francs as the
franc weakened amid rumors of a depreciation 
to Frs. 112.
4-17-37 The French Fund let the franc depreciate
from 106 3/8 to 110.
4-24-37 The Fund bought francs to drive the rate 
from 111 7/16 to 110 3/4, but could not 
maintain it at that level.
5-1-37 The franc strengthened from 111 1/2 to 110 1/4
with no evidence of intervention.
5-8-37 A London bus strike caused the franc to 
strengthen and there was still no evidence 
of intervention.
6-12-37 The Fund sold sterling (bought francs) heavily 
to support the exchange rate.
6-19-37 The Fund sold sterling heavily to support
the franc.
6-26-37 Because of a rumor of an impending devalu­
ation, the Fund was forced to buy francs 
heavily to support the rate.
7-3-37 Both the U.S. and British authorities were 
aiding the FESF to depreciate the franc.
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7-3-37 The French Fund admitted it had exhausted
its gold reserves supporting the franc at 
128-129.
7-10-37 The Fund bought francs to support the rate
at 128 1/4. The American Control also sup­
ported the franc.
7-17-37 A moderate demand for francs is thought to
have allowed the French fund to acquire gold 
through sales of francs.
7-24-37 After allowing the rate to rise to 133,
the French Fund bought francs to bring the 
rate back to 130. Later in the week, the 
Fund set the rate free and it depreciated 
to 135.
7-31-37 The Fund bought francs to bring rate from
135 to 132 7/8. The Fund regards Frs. 135
as the present limit of depreciation. Experts 
question how long the resources of the Fund 
can last.
8-7-37 "The Fund continued to support (bought francs)
both the spot and forward rate." The franc
is also receiving support in the form of 
the holiday tourist traffic.
8-14-37 The franc strengthened and the Fund sold
francs to acquire gold.
8-21-37 The Fund bought francs to hold the rate.
The end of the tourist demand is being 
anticipated.
8-28-37 The FESF bought francs as an interval French 
Government dispute over the proposed railway 
reforms weakened the franc.
9-11-37 "The French Fund revealed a decision on 
Thursday to cease the support of the franc." 
The rate fell from 132.95 to 134.50.
9-18-37 Both the BEEA and FESF bought francs to
support the exchange rate.
9-25-37 The French Fund spent L 5.0 million to support
the rate at Frs. 145. The announcement was
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made that gold from the Bank of France would 
not be available to support the franc; the 
French Fund was on its own.
10-2-37 Fund bought francs to support rate at
Frs. 144.60. Paris banks have suspended 
all dealings in forward francs at the request 
of the Bank of France.
10-16-37 The franc strengthened due to the uncertainty
of the New York and London stock markets.
The Fund sold approximately L 25 million 
of francs.
10-23-37 The French Fund continued to sell francs
heavily although the Fund was allowing an 
appreciation of the franc to take place in 
order to encourage capital repatriation.
10-30-37 After allowing the franc to depreciate to 
149, the Fund engineered a bear squeeze which 
started a general recovery, allowing the 
Fund to sell francs heavily at the week's 
end.
11-13-37 Gold shipments of $10 million to France
from the American Stabilization Fund gave 
a psychological lift to the franc. There 
was little intervention.
11-20-37 The French Fund actively sold francs for
dollars and converted the dollars to gold.
11-27-37 "There was little sign of any official
intervention."
12-4-37 The French Fund sold francs.
12-11-37 The Fund sold spot francs "spasmodically"
while buying francs forward.
12-18-37 The French Fund sold foreign exchange to
support the franc due to the effect on the 
exchange market of the poor French economic 
outlook.
12-25-37 The French Fund intervened both as a buyer
and seller, but in the net bought francs.
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1-1-38 Due to French strikes, the franc weakened.
The FESF "had to buy a fair quantity of 
francs" to support the exchange rate.
1-8-38 The FESF bought francs as the labor troubles
continued.
1-15-38 The Fund "bought francs intermittently."
1-22-38 Upon the resignation of the Ghautempo Govern­
ment, the franc depreciated to 154, then 
strengthened and the FESF used this oppor­
tunity to replenish its gold and devisen by 
selling francs.
1-29-38 The FESF sold spot francs and bought forward
francs.
2-5-38 The French Fund borrowed pounds in order
to buy francs to support the rate.
2-19-38 The FESF is using gold obtained from the
Bank of France to support both the spot and 
forward franc.
2-26-38 The Fund bought both spot and forward francs.
3-5-38 The FESF bought francs to support the rate.
3-12-38 "The French Exchange Fund has intervened
in the market (buying francs) but with the 
intention of braking rather than rigidly 
pegging the rate."
3-19-38 The Fund bought francs to slow a depreciation.
3-26-38 There was little support by the Fund as the 
franc depreciated.
4-16-38 Upon Blum's resignation and M. Daladier's 
victory in the Chamber, the franc strengthened 
and the FESF sold francs to replenish its 
resources.
4-23-38 "As the franc continued strong, the French
Control sold francs for sterling."
4-30-38 Upon rumors that M. Daladier would depreciate
the franc, the rate rose to Frs. 167, and by 
purchasing large quantities of francs the FESF 
brought the rate back to 160.
CHAPTER III
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRANC-FOUND EXCHANGE RATE
Fluctuations in the franc-pound exchange rate from 
September 1931 through April 1938 will be empirically 
analyzed in this and the following chapter. The effect 
of both "objective" cMid "non-objective" events will be 
taken into account.^ In this chapter the model used 
to conduct the analysis will be discussed. Chapter IV 
contains the empirical results of the investigation.
The Model
A major objective of this study is to examine those 
forces which are thought to determine the level of an 
exchange rate which is subject to some degree of official 
management or intervention. The implicit hypothesis 
being tested is that the level of the exchange rate is 
influenced primarily by fundamental economic forces 
(prices, incomes, money stocks and interest rates) but
Price, income, money stock levels and interest rate 
differentials are considered "objective" events. Such non- 
quantifiable events as the flight of funds from France in 
1935-36 and the Paris riots in 1934 are considered "non­
objective" events.
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is influenced on occasion by the activities of official 
government sources. The analysis will proceed as follows:
1. A supply-demand model for foreign exchange 
will be specified.
2. From this relationship a reduced form will 
be derived expressing the exchange rate (the 
dependent variable) as a linear function of 
its determinants (the independent variables).
3. Using ordinary least squares regression analysis 
the model will be estimated.
The data used in the study are monthly observations 
on British and French macroeconomic variables reported 
for the period September 1931 through April 1938.
O
Development of the Structural Model
The effect of official (or unofficial as the case 
may be) intervention in an exchange market is to alter 
the free interaction of supply and demand in determining 
the rate of exchange for two currencies. In a freely 
floating exchange market, the interaction of supply and 
demand is the sole determinant of the exchange rate. In 
an exchange market where the rate is rigidly pegged, 
private supply and demand do not determine the exchange
2
The author wishes to acknowledge the original develop­
ment of the model used in the present chapter. See John S. 
Hodgson, Fluctuations of the Pound-Sterling, 1919-1925 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 
1971), pp. 18-20.
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rate, but instead determine the quantity of currency 
which must be supplied or demanded by official government 
authorities to maintain the rigid pegged rate.
In an exchange market subject to occasional or fre­
quent official intervention, private supply and demand 
at times are the sole determinants of the exchange rate 
and at other times force officials to intervene in order 
to prevent an undesired rise or fall in the exchange 
rate. Official intervention is therefore a response 
to an exchange rate determined by supply and demand, 
but which for some reason is undesirable. In such cases 
as this, a structural model for determining the level 
of the exchange rate should include official intervention 
as well as private supply and demand.
This analysis will assume a bilateral relationship 
with two countries, F and UK.^ Given this relationship, 
domestic currency supplied by F is equivalent to a demand 
for the currency of UK. If the currency exchange rate 
is 100 units of F currency for one unit of UK currency, 
then an offer of 100 units of F currency is a demand 
for one unit of UK currency. For this reason it is 
possible to examine this market in terms of one currency 
only, in this case UK.
O
The reader is invited to mentally substitute "France' 
for "country F" and the "United Kingdom" for "country UK" 
in order to reduce the level of abstraction. This seems 
appropriate since this is a study of the franc-pound 
exchange rate.
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The demand for UK currency emanates from three 
sources: those wishing to purchase UK exports, those
wishing to purchase UK financial assets and by official 
sources for purposes of intervention in the exchange 
market :
1. The demand arising from trade exports from 
UK to F
Residents of F who wish to purchase goods and 
services from UK will demand UK currency to 
make these purchases. Should residents of 
F make payments in F currency then the exporters 
who receive F currency will convert this to 
UK currency. In either case, demand for UK 
exports gives rise to a demand for UK currency.
2. The demand arising from capital imports into UK 
Residents of F who wish to purchase UK assets 
will need UK currency to make payment. In 
addition UK residents who wish to repatriate 
assets held in F (or denominated in F currency) 
will demand UK currency.
3. The demand arising from intervention in the 
exchange market by official sources
If F currency appreciates relative to UK currency
and official sources wish to mitigate this
appreciation, then officials in F would demand
UK currency and/or officials in UK would demand
their own currency. This additional demand
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for UK currency would mitigate the appreciation 
of F currency relative to UK currency. Under 
a system of managed exchange rates, the inter­
vention by officials is done on a discretionary 
rather than a mandatory basis.
The supply of UK currency also emanates from three 
sources, those wishing to purchase F exports, those wishing 
to purchase F financial assets and by official sources 
for purposes of intervention in the exchange market:
1. The supply arising from trade imports to UK 
from F
Residents of UK who wish to purchase goods and 
services from F and residents of F converting 
the proceeds of sales of exports to F currency 
will supply UK currency.
2. The supply arising from capital exports from UK 
Residents of UK who wish to purchase assets in 
F (or denominated in F currency) and residents 
of F who wish to repatriate assets held in UK 
(or denominated in UK currency) will supply
UK currency.
3. The supply arising from intervention in the 
exchange market by official sources
If F currency depreciates relative to UK currency
and officials in F would supply UK currency
and/or officials in UK would supply their own
currency. This additional supply of UK currency
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would mitigate the depreciation of F currency
relative to UK currency. As before, inter­
vention by official sources is discretionary.
Trade Influences 
As suggested above, the demand for UK currency is
a direct function of the demand for UK goods and services
by residents of F, i.e. UK exports to F .
According to theory there are several important 
determinants of the demand for foreign produced goods 
or services. Among the most important are price levels 
in UK and F, the income level in F, seasonal effects 
and changes in tastes for foreign produced goods if the 
period under consideration is lengthy.
If the prices of F good and services rise above 
the prices of UK goods and services, then to the extent 
that UK goods and services are considered substitutes 
for F goods and services, F demand for UK exports and 
UK currency will increase. In addition, the exchange 
rate itself effects the demand for UK goods and services 
because it has a fundamental effect on UK prices as viewed 
by residents of F .
If the income elasticity of demand for UK products 
by residents of F is positive, then a rise of F income 
would result in an increased demand for UK goods and
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and services and therefore an increased demand for UK
4currency.^
Factors which operate with a seasonal pattern (e.g. 
tourism) and changes in tastes may also effect the demand 
for UK goods and services. Taking all of these into 
account, it may be written that:
?duk = Puk'Qx^
Qx = f (Pf/(ER.Puk), Yf, S%, T r * )
therefore
1- Tduk = Puk*f (Pf/(ER-Puk)> Yf, Sx, Tr%)
where
Tduk ~ The quantity of UK currency demanded 
in the exchange market to purchase 
UK goods and services.
Qx = An index of the physical quantity
of UK goods and services demanded
by F residents.
?£ = An index of the price level in F .
Puk “ An index of the price level in UK.
^Income changes as they are discussed here are "real" 
rather than "nominal.” If nominal income data were avail­
able, it should be adjusted for domestic price changes, 
thus assuming that there is no money illusion. The real 
versus nominal problem is not relevant to the present 
study. Since income data were not available on a monthly 
basis, employment and production indices were used as 
proxies. Either of these variables can be considered as 
approximators of real rather than nominal income.
Sgince both Puk and Qx are defined as indexes (of 
price levels and quantities demanded), the product of 
Puk'Qx Ts a value index of goods and services demand 
relative to base year prices.
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ER = The exchange rate; the price of
UK currency in terms of F currency.
Yg = An index of the income level in F.
= A seasonal index.
Tr^ = A trend index.
The supply of UK currency is a direct function of
the demand for F goods and services by UK residents,
i.e. UK imports from F . The supply of UK currency to
the exchange market for trade purposes therefore depends
on relative prices, the income level in UK, seasonal
effects and changes in tastes; it can be summarized as
follows :
^suk ~ (Pf/ER)Qm
Qm “ ^ (Puk/ (Pf/ER), Yuk' Tr^ )^ 
therefore
2. "Psuk ~ (Pf/ER)’f (P^^/(Pj/ER) , Y^^, S^, Tr^ )^
where
Tsuk T The quantity of UK currency supplied 
in the exchange market to purchase 
F goods and services.
= An index of the physical quantity 
of F goods and services demanded 
by UK residents.
Pg = An index of the price level in F .
Puk ~ An index of the price level in UK.
ER = The exchange rate; the price of
UK currency in terms of F currency.
Yuk “ An index of the income level in UK.
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= A seasonal index.
Trjjj = A trend index.
Capital Flow Influences 
Portfolio theory suggests that the demand for partic­
ular assets is a function of their expected return (includ­
ing an adjustment for risk) relative to that of all possible 
alternative assets in the portfolio of the decision-making 
unit. Additionally, the level of net wealth of the 
decision-making unit will have a direct (scale) effect 
on the demand for assets.^
International capital flows result when assets denom­
inated in foreign currencies are considered as possible 
alternatives to domestic currency assets and incentives 
exist which cause the foreign asset to be preferred to 
the domestic asset. Capital flows include short and long 
term components: Short-term components include portfolio
and covered-interest-arbitrage adjustments and are affected 
by both the uncovered and covered interest differential 
between countries as well as scale variables representing 
the levels of net wealth in the two countries. Long term 
capital flows (direct investments) are primarily affected
6por an excellent discussion of international capital 
movements, see R. C. Bryant, "Empirical Research on Finan­
cial Capital Flows," in Peter B. Kenen (ed.). International 
Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research (Forthcoming,
Cambridge University Press).
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by differences in the long-term growth of investment 
opportunities between countries.
The demand for UK assets by residents of F is there­
fore a function of the expected return of alternative 
assets (short and long-term) available to F residents 
and the level of net wealth of F residents. Since the 
demand for UK assets implies a demand for UK currency, 
any variable which causes changes in the demand for UK 
assets simultaneously causes a change in the demand for 
UK currency.
Assuming that interest rates indicate the yield 
on assets held for the short term and other things being 
equal, a rise in the UK interest rate relative to the 
F interest rate would induce F residents to seek higher 
yield in UK and transfer assets from F to UK. Residents 
of UK would likewise be induced to repatriate to UK assets 
held in F. In either case, the effect would be to increase 
the demand for UK currency.
If on the other hand the investor wishes to protect 
himself against the exchange rate risk involved in inter­
national financial transactions, then it is the covered 
rather than the uncovered-interest differential which 
must be considered as the determinant of short-term capital 
flows.
The above discussion implies that investors may 
respond to interest rate differentials in different ways.
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according to whether they are "hedgers" or "non-hedgers."
A hedger is defined as one who intends to repatriate 
funds invested in assets denominated in a foreign currency 
and wishes to avoid exchange risk in the process. If 
F funds flow to UK to seek a higher interest rate, then 
a transaction in the forward market (in this case a sale 
of UK currency) must be undertaken to avoid losses which 
would result from unfavorable exchange rate fluctuations.
In equilibrium, there will be a forward discount (or 
premium) on UK currency equal to the difference in interest 
rates in F and UK.? If the forward discount (or premium) 
is less than the interest rate differential, then it is 
an "intrinsic" discount (or premium) and not simply an 
interest rate differential which induces transactions by 
heugers, and one can argue that it is the appropriate 
variable for explaining covered interest-induced capital 
flows. In the case of non-hedgers, a rise in the UK 
interest rate relative to the F interest rate stimulates 
a demand for UK currency spot which is not offset by a 
forward sale of UK currency. In effect this open position 
defines the non-hedger as a speculator in the foreign 
exchange market. The non-hedger's motive may then be
?For a discussion of the theoretical foundations of 
this argument, see Leland B. Yeager, International Monetary 
Relations (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p p . 27-30, or 
R. E. Caves and R. W. Jones, World Trade and Payments 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company^ 1973), p p . 502-6.
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either the profit resulting from interest differential 
or from expected gain in the exchange transaction.
Long-term (direct) investments would presumably 
result from differences in long-term investment oppor­
tunities in UK and F. If F residents considered long­
term profit opportunities in UK superior to those in 
F , capital would flow into UK causing a demand for UK 
currency. If on the other hand, residents of UK believed 
that long-term profit opportunities in F were superior 
to those in UK, then funds would flow into F , causing 
a supply of UK currency.
Investors arrive at a subjective evaluation of 
"expected return" for any asset by considering not only 
the nominal yield, but the risk involved in holding the 
particular asset. If there were expectations that the 
risk involved in holding assets in F would increase or 
that the probability of capital loss on F assets were 
to increase, then a movement of capital out of F and 
into UK would likely result. Alternatively, if there 
were expectations that the risk involved in holding assets 
in UK would decrease or that the probability of capital 
gain on UK assets were to increase, then a movement of 
capital out of F and into UK would likely result. In% 
either case, the flow of capital might be in the same 
or opposite direction of the higher interest rate. Such 
events as domestic strikes, riots, elections, or
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expectations of impending currency devaluations or armed 
conflict could conceivably effect investors' attitudes 
toward the risk associated with assets in a particular 
country.
Taking all of this into account, the demand for UK 
currency involved in capital flows is:
3. Kduk = 1/ER'f
where
(rf-ruk). C, Mf, A, P
Kduk ^ The demand for UK currency arising
out of the demand for UK financial 
assets and out of the repatriation 
of funds to UK.
ER = The exchange rate.
(r£-r^^) = The differential in the interest
rate between F and UK.
C = The forward discount (premium).
Mf = The nominal money stock in F.
A = The growth of long term investment
opportunities in F .
F = Psychological forces which are the
result of increased risk or fears 
of capital loss in F assets or 
decreased risk or expectations of 
capital gains in UK assets.
Similarly, a supply of UK currency arises when resi­
dents of F and UK transfer funds from UK to F . The forces 
described above, but working in the opposite direction 
will induce these transfers to take place. A rise in 
the interest rate in F relative to the interest rate in 
UK would induce a flow of funds from UK to F . A decrease 
in the money stock in F and/or an increase in the money
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stock in UK would cause an increase in the supply of 
UK currency. Psychological forces which effect the degree 
of risk, fear of capital loss or the expectation of capital 
gain in F assets would influence the supply of UK currency. 
The supply of UK currency resulting from capital flows 
is therefore :
4. Kguk = f
where
Ksuk “ The supply of UK currency arising 
out of the demand for F financial 
assets and out of the repatriation 
of funds to F.
rf-ruk The differential in the interest 
rate between F and UK.
C = The forward discount (premium).
B = The growth of investment opportun­
ities in UK.
Muk = The nominal money stock in UK.
G = Psychological forces which are the
result of increased risk or fears 
of capital loss in UK assets or 
expectations of capital gains in 
F assets.
This is obviously a simple formulation considering 
the many complex economic forces which are thought to 
influence international capital flows. The foregoing 
gives attention to those economic forces which are well 
identified and accepted in the literature as important 
determinants of international capital flows.
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Official Intervention Influences
When management of the exchange rate is considered 
desirable by a country, this can be accomplished by increas­
ing the supply of or the demand for the currency and, to 
a greater or lesser extent, overriding the fundamental 
market forces described in the trade and capital flows 
sections above. The government must be willing and able 
to either buy or sell its own currency or the appropriate 
foreign currency. In order to carry out this activity, 
it is necessary for the government to have in its reserves 
a supply of domestic currency and foreign currency or 
gold. If F currency is appreciating relative to UK cur­
rency, then government of F could use domestic (F) currency 
to buy foreign (UK) currency to prevent or mitigate the 
appreciation. If the reverse were the case, a depreciation 
of F currency relative to UK currency could be prevented 
or mitigated by official sources in F selling UK currency 
for F currency. The government thus effects the exchange 
rate by operating through the law of supply and demand.
A demand for UK currency by official sources arises 
when UK currency depreciates relative to F currency (F 
currency appreciates). In such a situation F authorities 
would demand UK currency and UK authorities would demand 
their own currency if their intent were to prevent or 
retard the depreciation of UK currency. The demand for 
UK currency arising from official intervention is therefore:
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5. ®duk “ f(If> luk.)
where
Oduk ^ The demand for UK currency arising
out of official exchange rate manage­
ment activities.
If = The management activities of official 
sources in F.
= The management activities of official 
sources in UK.
Alternatively, a supply of UK currency by the govern­
ment arises when UK currency appreciates relative to F 
currency. To prevent or retard the appreciation of UK 
currency, F authorities could supply UK currency and/or 
UK authorities could supply their own currency to the 
exchange market. The supply of UK currency arising from 
official intervention is therefore:
6. ®suk ~ f(Tf> luk)
where
Osuk = The supply of UK currency arising
out of official exchange rate manage­
ment activities.
If = The management activities of official 
sources in F.
= The management activities of official 
sources in UK.
The Equilibrium Condition of the Model
As with other markets, equilibrium is said to exist 
in the exchange market when the quantity of UK currency 
demanded equals the quantity supplied. In terms of the 
preceding analysis, this is when
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7. Tduk + Kduk + Oduk “ Tsuk + Ksuk + Osuk-
The left side of the above equation is total demand 
or the sum of the individual demands arising from trade 
flows, capital flows and official intervention. The 
right side is total supply or the sum of the individual 
supplies arising from trade flows, capital flows, and 
official intervention. Equilibrium obtains when the 
exchange rate is at that level which equates total quantity 
demanded with total quantity supplied.
The Basic Model as a Linear Equation 
Based on the assumption that the functions are linear, 
the model will take the following form in terms of specific 
equations :
8. Tduk = (Puk) «0 + <^ 1 (Pf) + o2(Yf) +
(Puk)(ER)
“3 Ex "f o^Tr^
9. Tsuk - (Pf) 
Xë r T
*0 + ^1 __(Euk)-^ + ^2 (?uk) +
I /(ER)Wf)
^3 Exn 1^ 4 ^^x
Yq + Y2 (rf- ruk) + Y2 (Mf) + Y3A10. Kduk - 1
lERj
+ Y4 F + Y5 C
Kguk = Go + 61 (ff-fuk) + ^2® + ^3 (Muk) + 
Ô4G + Ô3C
12- Oduk = no + ni If + H2 luk
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13. Oguk ~ ^0 ^1 ^2 ^uk
14. Tduk + Kduk Oduk ~ Tsuk ~ Ksuk ~ Osuk = 0
In order to obtain a reduced form equation expressing 
the exchange rate as a function of the other variables, 
equations 8 through 13 were substituted into equation 14
and the resulting equation was solved for ER:
15. ER = ai(Pf)~(Pf)~ Trade Supply Function
^1(Puk)-(Puk)• Trade Demand Function
+ Capital Demand Function
+ Capital Supply Function - Oduk Og^k
Trade Supply Function = ag + ct2 (Yf) + ag S^
+ a^Tr%
Trade Demand Function = gg + g2 (Y^k) + gg S^
+ g^ Trjjj
Capital Demand Function = Yg + Yf (rf-r^k) +
Y2 (Mf) + Y3A + Y4F 
+ Y5C
Capital Supply Function = Yg + Yf - r^^J +
y^B + Y^(Muk) + Y4F 
+ Y5C
The Lag Structure of the Model 
To this point, an implicit assumption has been made 
that changes in fundamental economic variables during a 
given time period will be reflected in change in the 
exchange rate of the same time period. An argument can
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be made, however, that some impacts involve lags and 
still others are cumulative over several periods. The 
proper lag structure thus becomes an empirical question 
in itself. Economic theory, however, does provide some 
initial reference points.
Theory suggests that prices and the exchange rate 
should carry the same time subscript. The relative price 
of UK goods as seen by residents of F depends on F and 
UK prices and the exchange rates; all of the same period. 
One can argue also that the impact of interest rate differ­
entials on the exchange rate would be in the same period 
due to the high degree of capital mobility. On the other 
hand, changes in income, money stocks and long term invest­
ment opportunities would tend to operate with a lagged 
impact on the exchange rate. This follows from the prior 
notion that more time is required for individuals to 
respond to changes in their incomes, cash balances and 
direct investment opportunities than to price changes 
and interest differentials. The presence of and length 
of time lags is an empirical question. In order not 
to prejudge the issue, various lag structures were tried.
A single-period lag for income and money stock was con­
sidered "best" in that it produced the lowest error- 
variance of all the lag structures for prices. Interest 
rate differentials showed that "best" results were obtained 
when the time subscripts were identical for the exchange
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rate, prices and interest rate differentials. The basic 
model with appropriate time lags and the addition of a 
stochastic term is therefore:
16. ER = aQ + (Pf) + a2 (Puk^ “3 +
“4 (Yuk)-l + “5 + “6 + ^7
+  “ 8  ( ^ ^ ) - l  +  G 9 A - I  +  “10^-1 +  “ll^f +  
aizluk + “13^1 + 01482 + 015S3 + ai^Tr + 
G i y O l  +  • ■ • +  % n +16 ° n  +  ^
In equation 16 the S variables include the net effects 
of seasonal effects and the Tr variable includes trend 
effects. The dummy variables through represent 
the occurrence of non-quantifiable events which are thought 
to have influenced the exchange rate. In the structural 
equations, the non-quantifiable events were represented 
by F and G.
The variables If and I^k are dummies representing 
official intervention in the exchange market by F and UK.
In the structural equations, this official demand and
supply for UK currency was represented by O^uk and Og^k-
An alternative form for equation 16 which conserves 
degrees of freedom is :
17. ER = (Pf/Puk) + “2 +
03 (rf-^uk) + 04 (C) + 05 (Mf/Muk)-1 +
“6 (=f-fuk) + 07(A/B)_i + agif + ogly^k +
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*^10^1 ^ ^12^3 ■*"•••"*“ 
“n+13 °n +
Using implicit differentiation, the predicted signs 
of the coefficients in equations 16 and 17 were obtained.
These results are shown in Table 3-1.
In the chapter which follows, least-squares regression 
techniques will be used to estimate equations 16 and 17.
67
TABLE 3-1
PREDICTED SIGNS OF 
OF EXPLANATORY
COEFFICIENTS
VARIABLES
Equation 16 Equation 17
Variable Sign Variable Sign
Pf + Pf/Puk +
Puk - Yf/Yuk
+
Yf + (ff-fuk) -
^uk - Mf/Muk +
- A/B -
Mf + If +
^uk - luk +
A - Si unknown
B + S2 unknown
If + S3 unknown
luk
+ Tr unknown
^1 unknown °1
unknown
S2 unknown Dg • • • D^ +
S3 unknown
Tr unknown
Dl unknown
Ü2 • • • +
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND COMPARISON 
WITH OTHER STUDIES
In this chapter, an empirical analysis will be made 
of fluctuations in the franc-pound exchange rate during 
the period August 1931 through April 1938. The analysis 
will utilize equations 16 and 17, which were developed 
in Chapter III. In the first section of this chapter, 
the data used in the study will be discussed. Following 
this, results obtained from the least squares regression 
analysis are presented. Finally, the results obtained 
here will be compared with those of other studies.
Data
For all variables specified in the model, monthly 
observations were reported or could be calculated from 
weekly observations. This analysis covers the period 
from August 1931 through April 1938 or eighty-one months.
In all cases which follow, one or more variables are lagged 
one period; thus the number of observations in the regres­
sions is eighty.
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A monthly time series was not available for the 
franc-pound exchange rate. Weekly high and low rates 
were reported in The Economist and these were averaged 
to obtain a monthly rate. Table A-1, Appendix A, contains 
the franc-pound exchange rates used in this study.
Wholesale price indices were reported for both France 
and the United Kingdom in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
Retail prices were not available for the entire period 
for France and therefore the wholesale price indices 
were used. Tables A-2 and A-3 contain the French and 
British wholesale prices used in this study, while 
Table A-4 contains the same data in ratio form (Pf/P^k^•
No monthly series of national income levels was 
available for either France or the UK. Employment or 
production levels can be considered as reasonable proxies 
for income in such situations. For both countries an 
index of the level of employment was constructed using 
data found in two sources. For the period from August 
1931 through March 1933 data were taken from the Inter­
national Labor Review using a base year of 1924. For the 
remainder of the period, April 1933 through April 1938, 
data reported by The Statistical Yearbook of the League 
of Nations with a base year of 1929 were used. The former 
figures were adjusted to conform to the 1929 base year.
For France, an index of total industrial production was 
reported in The Economist. Similar data for UK were
70
reported on a quarterly rather than a monthly basis and 
therefore could not be used. Tables A-5 and A-6 contain 
employment indices for France and UK, while Table A-7 
contains an index of industrial production for France.
An index of employment ratios is presented in
Table A-8 and an index showing the ratio of French indus­
trial production to employment in the UK is shown in 
Table A-9.
For purposes of this study, an definition of 
the money stock (currency in circulation plus demand 
deposits) was employed. The Federal Reserve Bulletin 
reported separate series for currency in circulation and 
demand deposits. These have been summed to compile 
Tables A-10 and A-11 which show the money supply for 
France and the UK respectively. Table A-12 contains 
an index of the ratio of the money supplies .
For the period under study, only one interest rate 
series was readily available for France. The Federal 
Reserve Bulletin reported the private discount rate for 
French banks on a monthly basis for the entire eighty-one 
month period. The League of Nations in The Statistical 
Yearbook reported the discount rate at the Bank of France, 
but a large gap existed in the data during 1934. There­
fore, only the private discount rate reported in the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin could be used in the present 
study. As a proxy for "the" interest rate in the United
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Kingdom, the British 2%% consol rate as reported in The 
Statistical Yearbook was used. Table A-13 shows the 
monthly interest rate differential between the French 
private discount rate and the British 2%% consol rate
( ^ f “ ^ u k ^ •
Regrettably, no monthly series for the forward franc 
could be found, and therefore it was not possible to 
construct a series indicating the forward discount (or 
premium). For this reason, the effects of covered interest 
arbitrage on the level of the franc-pound rate could not 
be tested.
The adoption of a suitable proxy for the growth of 
long term investment presented several problems. The 
best proxy would probably be the growth of real GNP or 
National Income, but as previously indicated, neither 
were reported monthly during this period. A second best 
alternative would be the growth of industrial production. 
Such a series was available for France, but not for the 
United Kingdom. Lacking a suitable proxy, no test was 
made to estimate the effect which differences in long 
term investment potential had on capital flows and there­
fore on the franc-pound exchange rate.
Because it was felt that public knowledge of their 
operations would impair the effectiveness of their stabil­
ization activities, neither the French nor the British 
divulged quantitative information on the activities of
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their exchange management agencies. Their presence in 
the exchange market was evident and reported in the 
literature.
The Economist carried weekly accounts of activity 
by both the BEEA and FESF and served as the source for 
the construction of dummy variables representing official 
intervention in the exchange market. Although the BEEA 
was also actively involved in the dollar-pound exchange 
market, only intervention with regard to influencing 
the franc-pound rate is considered here. The FESF on 
the other hand confined its activities to the management 
of the franc-pound rate. The intervention dummy variables 
(Ig) and (l^k^ were constructed in the following manner:
If it was reported that the FESF bought pounds (or sold 
francs) during a particular month, a value of "plus one" 
was recorded for that month. If the FESF was reported 
to have sold pounds (or bought francs) a value of "minus 
one" was recorded. If no activity was reported for the 
FESF for a particular month, a value of "zero" was recorded. 
Using the same criteria, a dummy variable was constructed 
to capture the intervention activities of the BEEA. A 
value of "plus one" indicated the BEEA bought pounds 
(sold francs); a value of "minus one" indicated a sale 
of pounds (bought francs); no reported activity by the 
BEEA was indicated by a "zero." Since the activity by 
the BEEA and FESF were reported weekly, the possibility
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existed that either of the funds might have bought during 
one week and sold during another week of the same month. 
This situation occurred during several months. The pro­
cedure used to determine the value for the dummy variable 
during that month was to assign a "plus one" (+1) for 
each week in which the funds bought pounds, assign a "minus 
one" (-1) for each week in which the funds sold pounds 
and counted the pluses and minuses algebraically to find 
the net effect for the month. For instance during January 
1938 the FESF intervened in the market in each of the 
four weeks, on three occasions to sell francs (+3) and 
on one occasion to buy francs (-1) . For the month of 
January 1938, the net effect of intervention by the FESF 
was recorded as "plus" indicating that for the month, 
it sold francs.
The weekly reporting of BEEA and FESF activity sug­
gested an alternative procedure, A second set of inter­
vention dummies was constructed by summing the "plus 
ones," "minus ones" and "zeros" for each week of a given 
month and assigning this value to the dummy for the BEEA 
and FESF. It was hoped that this procedure might better 
capture the magnitude of intervention by the exchange 
management agencies. Using this procedure, a value of 
"plus two" (+2) was assigned to the FESF dummy for January 
1938 since the Fund sold francs during three weeks (+3) 
and bought francs during one week (-1). To distinguish
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between the two sets of dummy variables generated, the 
former are hereafter referred to as "regular" and the 
latter as "high-powered" intervention dummies. Tables A-15 
and A-16 show "regular" and "high-powered" dummy variables 
for the FESF while Tables A-17 and A-18 show the "regular" 
and "high-powered" dummy variables for the BEEA. The 
information used to construct these tables is contained 
in Appendix II.
A third possibility for evaluating intervention by 
the two stabilization funds was to assign values repre­
senting the intensity of intervention (e.g. heavy, moderate 
or light). However the writers in The Economist did not 
always mention the magnitude of intervention, and when 
they did, they used words which required subjective evalu­
ation by the reader (e.g. "mild," "occasional," "sporadic," 
"massive," "pervasive"). Because this type of evaluation 
would involve too much subjective interpretation it was 
not included in this study.
To test for the presence of seasonal influences on 
the exchange rates, three-month groupings were used to 
construct dummy variables (Si), (82) and (S3). April,
May and June comprise the spring variable (S^); July,
August and September comprise the summer variable (Sg); 
October, November and December comprise the fall variable 
(S3). Table A-19 shows the dummy variables (Si), (S2) 
and (S3).
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The trend variable is simply a series of sequential 
integers (1-80).
The dummy variables represent events
which were thought to have affected the exchange rate, but 
whose influence could not be quantified. Separate dummy 
variables were constructed for each such event as follows: 
If the event was reported as present during a period 
(month) and was thought to cause an appreciation of the 
pound (a rise in the franc-pound exchange rate) a value of 
"plus one" was assigned. Alternatively, values of "minus 
one" were assigned if the event was reported and thought 
to cause depreciation of the pound (a fall in the franc- 
pound exchange rate). The event not being reported as 
present resulted in an assignment of "zero" for that 
period. The sources used for the reporting of the events 
were Wolfe, Wynne, and Dulles and were substantiated by 
The Economist.^
In the following section, several non-quantifiable 
events which were thought to have caused movements in the 
exchange rate are discussed. These events, in most cases, 
were thought to have resulted in changes in attitudes
Wolfe, The French Franc between the Wars, 1919-1939; 
Wynne, "The French Franc"; and Dulles, "The French Franc 
in 1935," The Harvard Business Review, pp. 146-60. Events 
cited in these sources were checked against the weekly 
reports in The Economist. Dummy variables were constructed 
when there was agreement among all of the sources.
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toward risk and/or expectations regarding capital gains 
(or losses).
The Dummy Variables 
In April 1933 the United States left the gold standard 
and the dollar depreciated relative to all gold standard 
currencies and the pound. For a period of thirteen months, 
the dollar "floated" in the foreign markets finally being
O
repegged to gold in April 1934. This is the first major 
event of the period which could have affected the franc- 
pound exchange rate, but which could not be quantified.
With each of the three major exchange rates "floating," 
opportunities for currency arbitrage were increased.
Thus movements in either the dollar-franc rates or the 
dollar-pound rate could generate discrepancies in the 
cross rates and therefore profit opportunities. To the 
extent that three currency arbitrage occurred, it would 
have affected the franc-pound rate. Dummy variable 
represents the effects of the U.S. decision to let the 
dollar float.3
The riots which occurred in Paris during February 
1934 were a second set of events thought to have affected 
the exchange rate. Their alleged effect was to produce
For an in-depth account of the events surrounding 
the U.S. dollar devaluation, see J. D. Paris, Monetary 
Policies of the United States 1932-1938, chap. ii.
^Table A-20, Appendix A, shows the values assigned 
to this dummy.
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a general uneasiness about the relative safety of French 
investments and a flow of funds out of France, thus depreci­
ating the franc. During one week in February 1934 the 
Bank of France's gold reserves dropped by 2 billion francs 
and for the months of February and March, reserves fell 
by 8-9 billion f r a n c s . ^ The effect of the "riots" is 
represented by dummy variable
Dummy variable D^ represents the impact of the devalu­
ation of the belga by the Belgian government in late March 
1935 and events following the devaluation. This is the 
third major event of the period thought to have affected 
the franc-pound rate. The devaluation was considered by 
many as a precursor of a devaluation of the French franc.
In four days, the Bank of France lost more than 1.5 billion 
francs in gold reserves.^ Following the devaluation of 
the belga, a flight of capital from France occurred. First 
in April 1935 and later in November of the same year, 
speculation arose that the franc would soon go the way of 
the pound, the dollar and the belga--that devaluation 
would soon occur. The high probability attached to the 
severance of the tie between the franc and gold resulted 
in outflows of capital from France. Added to this was
^Martin Wolfe, The French Franc between the Wars, 
1919-1939, p. 129.
^See Table A-21, Appendix A.
&Wolfe, French Franc, p. 114; Wynne, "French Franc," 
p. 508.
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the activity of speculators betting on the imminent devalu­
ation of the f r a n c . 7 These "flights” from the franc were 
thought to depreciate the franc relative to the pound 
and are represented by dummy variable
A fourth event of the period occurred in 1935 after 
the election of a new French government. In April 1935 
Pierre Laval was brought into power and he immediately 
sought to produce a country wide deflation of wages and 
prices. Reasoning that deflation was preferable to devalu­
ation as a cure for the economic problems of France, the 
new administration issued 539 "decree-laws" designed 
to force down wages and prices.^ This policy allegedly 
produced an appreciation of the franc relative to the 
pound by generating expectations of more favorable terms 
of trade for France. Dummy variable D4 represents the 
effects of the Laval "deflation” policy.
A fifth event of the period which is represented 
by dummy variable was the election of the Popular 
Front party headed by Leon Blum.^^ Upon taking office
7Wynne, "French Franc," pp. 502-8; Dulles, "French 
Franc," pp. 158-60.
^See Table A-22, Appendix A.
Q
Wolfe, French Franc, pp. 114-5; Wynne, "French 
Franc," pp. 504-5.
^^See Table A-23, Appendix A.
^^See Table A-24, Appendix A.
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in June 1936 Blum and the Popular Front advocated liberal 
economic reforms such as paid holidays, public works 
programs and support prices for wheat and other grains.
The implementation of such measures was alleged to have 
a depressing effect on confidence in the Paris money 
market and resulted in a depreciation of the franc relative 
to the pound.
A sixth major event was the "pause" in social and 
economic reforms announced by the Socialist party on 
February 14, 1 9 3 7 . This was a move intended to prevent 
a continued depreciation of the franc and its alleged 
effects were to cause a fall in the franc-pound rate.
Dummy variable Dg represents the effects of the "pause.
In June 1937 a seventh major event occurred and is 
represented by dummy variable B y . The effects of the 
"pause" announcement of the Blum administration in February 
1937 mitigated speculative attacks on the franc until 
a "panic" situation occurred in June.^^ This speculative 
attack in the exchange rate of the franc supposedly 
resulted from the dangerous position of the French Treasury.
^^Wolfe, French Franc, pp. 139-49 
^^Wolfe, French Franc, pp. 152-4. 
^^See Table A-25, Appendix A. 
^^See Table A-26, Appendix A. 
^^Wolfe, French Franc, p. 156.
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The alleged effect of the "panic” was a depreciation 
of the franc and a rise in the franc-pound exchange rate.
An eighth and final event of the period was an 
announcement made by the French Council of Ministers 
in October 1937. With the seasonal decline in the tourist 
industry, the exchange position of the franc was extremely 
critical and an emergency meeting of the Council was called 
at the President's summer home in Rambouillet.^^ The 
"Declaration of Rambouillet" was issued--a statement 
that France would deal firmly and quickly with its economic 
and financial problems without recourse to any type of 
exchange control. This announcement had the alleged 
effect of strengthening the Paris money market and causing 
a fall in the franc-pound exchange rate. Dummy variable 
Dg represents the effects of the "Declaration of 
Rambouillet.
Empirical Results 
In this section, the relationship between the franc- 
pound exchange rate and the variables discussed in the 
past section will be analyzed. Equations 16 and 17 which 
were developed in a previous section will be estimated 
using least-squares regression techniques. These equations 
will serve as the basis for extending the analysis through
^^Wolfe, French Franc, pp. 178-9, 
^^See Table A-27, Appendix A.
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modification or deletion of independent variables. The 
results for equation 16 are shown in Table 4-1.
Of the twenty-two explanatory variables contained 
in equation 16, nine were significant at the 0.05 level.
Of these nine, the following carried the expected sign-- 
the French and British price levels, the proxy for French 
national income and dummy variables representing French 
exchange intervention (I^), "flights" from the franc (D^) 
and the "pause" in French social reforms (D^). Of the 
quantifiable economic fundamentals, the proxy for British 
national income, the French and British money stocks and 
the interest rate differential were not significant. The 
British employment index carried the correct sign but 
was not significant.
Trend (Tr) was significant and carried a positive 
sign. This indicates that those forces (e.g. tastes) 
affected by time were working to cause the franc to depreci­
ate relative to the pound. None of the seasonal dummy 
variables were significant. The dummy variables repre­
senting the deflationary policies of Fermier Laval (D^) 
and the election of the Popular Front government (D^) 
were highly significant but carried signs opposite to 
those expected.
According to the results, the deflationary policies 
caused a rise in the franc-pound rate. This can perhaps 
be explained by the effects the policies had on capital
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TABLE 4-1 
INITIAL TEST OF EQUATION 16
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound rate - - -
Constant 33.31538 - -
Price Index-France 0.31984 0.02276 14.24
Price Index-UK -1.40901 0.38953 3.62
Employment Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.12213 0.03343 3.65
Employment Index-UK 
(Lagged 1-Period) -0.07479 0.04699 1.59
M -France (Lagged 
^1-Period) 0.0002 0.00021 0.07
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) -0.00688 0.01176 0.58
0.81003 0.73637 1.10
BEEA (Iu%) -0.13034 0.84851 0.15
FESF (If) 3.82470 1.57693 2.43
Trend (Tr) 0.72861 0.16868 4.32
Spring (Sf) 1.60024 1.55915 1.03
Summer (S^) 0.05530 1.82510 0.01
Fall (S3) -1.47074 1.64537 0.89
US Devaluation (Df) -1.82416 1.65408 1.10
Riots (D2) -5.77841 3.08693 1.87
Flights (D3) 3.20657 1.47551 2.17
Deflation (D^) -6.65400 2.72519 2.44
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TABLE 4-1 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Election (D^) -8.54236 3.00859 2.84
Pause (D^) 9.06934 3.43028 2.64
Panic (Dy) 0.3373 3.6776 0.09
Declaration (Dg) 1.52280 4.40891 0.34
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0.97 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.46
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flows and price levels. The deflationary policies worked 
to produce lower relative prices and thus strengthened 
the franc. To a great extent, however, this would be 
reflected in the French price level variable. On the 
other hand deflationary policies were not generally 
accepted as an optimal solution to French industrial 
recovery. For this reason, deflation may have resulted
1 9
in an outflow of capital from France. The outflow 
of capital would weaken the franc and would not be reflected 
in another variable in the equation. On this basis, the 
expected sign for the "deflation" dummy variable would be 
negative and be supported by the study.
The argument that the election of the Popular Front 
government (and its subsequent social reform policies) had 
a depreciating effect on the franc was that Popular Front 
programs caused a deterioration of the confidence in the 
French government by increasing the deficit position of 
the government's budget. This could have precipitated 
an outflow of capital and/or a speculative attack on 
the franc. On the other hand, there was in fact a strong
^^At least two reasons can be offered for the pessimism 
which accompanied the deflation policies. First, it was 
not apparent to many businessmen and economists that 
falling prices and wages was the correct solution. Many 
favored devaluation and policies to stimulate rising prices 
and wages. Second, many doubted that the magnitude of 
deflation necessary to avoid devaluation was possible even 
if they agreed with the policy theoretically.
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"Keynesian” flavor to the Popular Front programs. Measures 
which reduced unemployment and increased consumer's income 
served business and industry as well as the labor force. 
Higher wages could result in higher p r o f i t s . ^0 To the 
extent that the experiments of the Popular Front govern­
ment were viewed in this latter perspective, their effect 
would have resulted in an appreciation of the franc.
In the light of the results of this study, the effects 
of the election were to increase the confidence in the 
franc and bring about downward pressure on the franc- 
pound rate.
The fact that neither individual money stock variable 
was significant (both did carry the correct sign) indicates 
that the cash balance effect was not acting to influence 
the exchange rate. This was perhaps the most surprising 
result obtained in experiments with equation 16. A partial 
explanation results from examining the relationship between 
the money stock and price levels. The crude quantity 
theory of money suggests that the level of the money 
stock determines the level of prices. Not unexpectedly, 
the two variables were highly correlated.21 To some 
extent then, the effect of the money stock on the
21*Wolfe, French Franc, pp. 138-40.
2lThe partial correlation coefficient for the French 
price index and lagged money stock was 0.571 and for the 
UK price index and lagged money stock was 0.868.
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exchange rate may have been absorbed by the price level 
variable.^2
The interest rate differential was not significant 
nor did it carry the expected sign. Due to the manner 
in which the Bank of France manipulated discount rates 
during this period, these results are not surprising.
The discount rate was normally raised in response to 
depreciations of the franc and was therefore viewed by 
speculators as a signal that the franc was in trouble.
At such times, an interest rate differential favoring 
an inflow of capital may have had little effect on the 
actual direction of capital flows.
While the coefficient of multiple correlation is 
quite high for equation 16 (R^ = 0.98), the somewhat 
low value of the Durbin-Watson ratio (1.46) indicates 
that the residuals are positively correlated. This sug­
gests that one or more explanatory variables may have 
been omitted. This may well be the case since the effects
? 2In a separate experiment, the French and British 
price level variables were omitted from equation 16. In 
this formulation, both money stock variables were signifi­
cant and carried the correct sign. This suggests that 
money stock changes were affecting the exchange rate 
through changes in the price level. The results were:
Regression
Variable Coefficient t-Score
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) -0.05121 2.17
Mg-F (Lagged 1-Period) 0.00222 6.36
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of "third country events" on the franc-pound exchange 
rate have been ignored.
Table 4-2 shows the results obtained for equation 16 
when the "high-powered" intervention dummy variables were 
substituted for the "regular" intervention dummy variables. 
The major effect of this substitution is the increase 
in the t-score of the variable representing French exchange 
intervention. In addition, both and the Durbin-Watson 
ratio were slightly improved over the results obtained 
using "regular" intervention. These improvements are 
encouraging since they were obtained by using techniques 
which attempted to better "quantify" the information that 
was available.
A second experiment was made utilizing equation 16.
As the proxy for French national income, an index of 
French industrial production was substituted for the index 
of French employment. The results of this experiment, 
shown in Table 4-3, were somewhat mixed. While there 
was an improvement in the Durbin-Watson ratio, showed 
a decrease. Of more importance, the index of industrial 
production did not appear as a significant variable at 
the 0.05 level as indicated by its t-score of 1.46. The 
t-score of dummy variable Dg (flights from the franc) 
was lowered and the variable was no longer significant. 
Otherwise, the substitution produced only minor changes 
in the t-scores of significant variables. On the basis
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TABLE 4-2
TEST OF EQUATION 16 WITH "HIGH-POWERED"
BRITISH AND FRENCH INTERVENTION
DUMMY VARIABLES
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant 17.38861 - -
Price Index-France 0.31351 0.02174 14.42
Price Index-UK -1.42360 0.37631 3.78
Employment Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.12163 0.03258 3.73
Employment Index-UK 
(Lagged 1-Period) -0.06303 0.04574 1.38
Mg-France (Lagged 1- 
Period) 0.00005 0.00020 0.25
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) -0.00308 0.01166 0.26
~^uk 0.21139 0.73653 0.29
"High-Powered" BEEA (luk) -0.33683 0.38498 0.87
"High-Powered" FESF (If) 2.09037 0.65831 3.18
Trend (Tr) 0.70973 0.16667 4.26
Spring (Si) 1.43070 1.47845 0.97
Summer (S2) -0.54927 1.74710 0.31
Fall (S3) -2.07821 1.58482 1.31
US Devaluation (D^) -1.96129 1.58325 1.24
Riots (D2) -5.45757 2.96677 1.84
Flights (D3) 3.10348 1.42921 2.17
89
TABLE 4-2 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Deflation (D^) -6.49348 2.66750 2.43
Election (D^) -9.32071 2.91610 3.20
Pause (Dg) 9.75935 3.34010 2.92
Panic (Dy) 0.92490 3.55089 0.26
Declaration (Dg) 1.33719 3.85177 0.35
= 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0.97 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.48
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TABLE 4-3
TEST OF EQUATION 16 WITH "HIGH-POWERED"
INTERVENTION DUMMIES AND FRENCH
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant 84.86383 - -
Price Index-France 0.33514 0.02290 14.63
Price Index-UK -1.28145 0.41547 3.08
Industrial Production 
Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.17351 0.11843 1.46
Employment Index-UK 
(Lagged 1-Period) -0.05752 0.05062 1.14
Mg-France (Lagged 1- 
Period) 0.00007 0.00023 0.32
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) -0.00557 0.01300 0.43
B-f "&uk 0.49684 0.81152 0.61
"High-Powered" BEEA (1^%) -0.20736 0.42063 0.49
"High-Powered" FESF (I^) 2.34318 0.72290 3.24
Trend (Tr) 0.51559 0.18104 2.85
Spring (S^) 1.79076 1.61317 1.11
Summer (S2) 2.30164 1.75003 1.32
Fall (S3) 0.97589 1.49165 0.65
US Devaluation (D^) -2.18096 2.00336 1.09
Riots (D2) -5.92746 3.29611 1.80
Flights (D3) 2.63112 1.55569 1.69
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TABLE 4-3 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Deflation (D^) -7.84871 2.89587 2.71
Election (D^) -9.98209 3.18228 3.14
Pause (Dg) 11.87817 3.58759 3.31
Panic (Dy) 1.32032 4.17575 0.32
Declaration (Dg) 3.13601 4.17612 0.75
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0.97 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.51
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of these results the index of French employment seemed 
the better proxy for French national income.
The results for the initial estimation of equation 17 
(fundamental variables in ratio form) are shown in 
Table 4-4. Although these results are in general agree­
ment with those of Table 4-1, some important differences 
were derived: While the R for equation 17 was slightly
lower, the Durbin-Watson ratio was improved. Also, in 
equation 16 neither individual money stock variable was 
significant, but in ratio form the variable
was significant and carried the correct sign. This 
supports the contention that the cash balance effect 
was working to influence the exchange rate.
In ratio form, price and employment indices were 
highly significant and carried the correct sign, but 
the interest rate differential remained insignificant.
As in the previous estimation, the t-score for the 
dummy variable Dg was decreased and the variable could 
no longer be considered significant at the 0.05 level.
In all other cases, dummy variables which were significant 
in equation 16 remained significant and carried the same 
sign in the initial estimation of equation 17.
Table 4-5 shows the results obtained utilizing equa­
tion 17 and substituting the "high-powered” intervention 
dummy variable for the "regular" intervention dummy vari­
able. The Durbin-Watson ratio decreased somewhat but
93
TABLE 4-4 
INITIAL ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 17
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant -226.48991 - -
Price Index Ratio 
(F/UK) 28.31288 1.59433 17.76
Employment Index Ratio 
(F/UK) (Lagged 1- 
Period) 136.67170 28.16417 4.85
Mg Ratio (F/UK) 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.31446 0.14503 2.17
0.44443 0.73461 0. 60
BEEA duk) -0.23986 0.84221 0.28
FESF (If) 4.16757 1.51790 2.75
Trend (Tr) 1.07624 0.14911 7.22
Spring (Sf) 1.53105 1.34245 1.14
Summer (S2) 0.26217 1.59766 0.16
Fall (S3) -1.56280 1.46553 1.07
US Devaluation (D^) -0.96842 1.49913 0.65
Riots (D2) -4.29338 2.89167 1.48
Flights (D3) 2.62697 1.43235 1.83
Deflation (D4) -6.70170 2.69850 2.48
Election (D5) -9.79297 2.64049 3.71
Pause (Dg) 8.70640 2.28965 3.80
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TABLE 4-4 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Panic Dy) 
Declaration (Dg)
3.11643
-0.35752
2.54994
3.93020
1.22
0.09
= 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0 . 9 7 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.57
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TABLE 4-5
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 17 WITH "HIGH-POWERED"
BRITISH AND FRENCH INTERVENTION
DUMMY VARIABLES
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant -218.18414 - -
Price Index Ratio 
(F/UK) 28.26570 1.55221 18.21
Employment Index Ratio 
(F/UK) (Lagged 1- 
Period) 131.51384 27.38286 4.80
Mg Ratio (F/UK) 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.27569 0.14205 1.94
-0.08660 0.73562 0.12
"High-Powered" BEEA (^uk) -0.27645 0.38354 0.72
"High-Powered" FESF (If) 2.17672 0.63370 3.43
Trend (Tr) 1.06506 0.14512 7.34
Spring (S^) 1.29646 1.28109 1.01
Summer (S2) -0.36062 1.53946 0.23
Fall (S3) -2.07356 1.40168 1.48
US Devaluation (D^) -0.89481 1.44160 0.62
Riots (Dg) -4.42014 2.78965 1.58
Flights (D3) 2.65033 1.38880 1.91
Deflation (D^) -6.85432 2.64373 2.59
Election (D5) -10.02837 2.56303 3.92
Pause (Dg) 9.42656 2.25271 4.18
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TABLE 4-5 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Panic (Dy) 3.53632 2.46676 1.43
Declaration (Dg) -0.84296 3.42755 0.24
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. =0. 9 7 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.49
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there was an improvement in r2 and in most t-scores for 
significant variables. The major improvements in t-scores 
were noted in the French intervention and pause dummy 
variables. In addition, the "flights" dummy variable 
was marginally significant. Generally, the results of 
this experiment with equation 17 were consistent with 
previous results.
In a second experiment with equation 17, the index 
of French industrial production was substituted for the 
index of French employment. The results are shown in 
Table 4-6. There was a slight decrease in both and 
the Durbin-Watson ratio. The ratio of French to British 
employment was highly significant in both of the previous 
experiments with equation 17 ; substitution of the index 
of industrial production resulted in a large decrease 
in the t-score but the variable did remain significant. 
While there was a change in all t-scores, there were no 
new significant variables as a result of this substitution.
In general, this confirms the results obtained in 
Table 4-3 and indicates that the level of employment is 
the preferred proxy for French national income.
A final experiment with both equations 16 and 17 
involved omission of all variables which had not been 
significant in any of the previous experiments. The 
results are shown in Table 4-7 and Table 4-8. As expected, 
this experiment resulted in decreased r 2 and Durbin-Watson
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TABLE 4-6
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 17 WITH "HIGH-POWERED"
INTERVENTION DUMMIES AND FRENCH
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant -122.66199 - -
Price Index Ratio 
(F/UK) 31.92117 1.45088 22.00
Industrial Production- 
France/Employment 
Index-UK (Lagged 1- 
Period) 229.16214 108.40967 2.11
Mg Ratio (F/UK) (Lagged 
1-Period) 0.22025 0.16440 1.34
Rf-Ruk 0.22447 0.83529 0.27
"High-Powered" BEEA (1^%) -0.23153 0.43589 0.53
"High-Powered" FESF (If) 2.60300 0.72596 3.59
Trend (Tr) 0.62897 0.11418 5.51
Spring (Sf) 0.99626 1.45028 0.69
Summer (S2) 1.89229 1.72765 1.10
Fall (S3) 0.41921 1.47438 0.28
US Devaluation (Df) -1.93198 1.85637 1.04
Riots (D2) -5.87878 3.19399 1.84
Flights (D3) 2.51822 1.57361 1.60
Deflation (D^) -8.45856 2.96776 2.85
Election (D5) -12.43674 2.86881 4.34
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TABLE 4-6 - Continued
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Pause (D^) 11.64150 2.60136 4.48
Panic (Dy) 3.80183 2.81940 1.35
Declaration (Dg) 1.62521 3.91668 0.41
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0 . 9 7 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.41
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TABLE 4-7
FINAL TEST FOR EQUATION 16 WITH INSIGNIFICANT 
VARIABLES OMITTED
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant 18.89914 - -
Price Index-France 0.32792 0.01233 26.60
Price Index-UK -1.62916 0.21676 7.52
Employment Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.07223 0.02554 2.83
"High-Powered" FESF (If) 1.58871 0.44968 3.53
Trend (Tr) 0.47983 0.07336 6.54
Flights (D3) 3.50658 1.38208 2.54
Deflation (D4) -7.57697 2.39877 3.16
Election (D^) -8.80780 2.14754 4.10
Pause (Dg) 8.05846 2.37313 3.40
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0.97 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.12
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TABLE 4-8
FINAL TEST FOR EQUATION 17 WITH INSIGNIFICANT 
VARIABLES OMITTED
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Franc-Pound Rate - - -
Constant -209.10361 - -
Price Index Ratio 
(F/UK) 28.84951 1.27370 22.65
Employment Index Ratio 
(F/UK) (Lagged 1- 
Pericd) 112.28154 25.05593 4.48
Mg Ratio (F/UK) (Lagged 
1-Period) 0.34553 0.13196 2.62
"High-Powered” FESF (If) 1.70627 0.45341 3.76
Trend (Tr) 1.03093 0.13505 7.63
Flights (Dg) 2.68465 1.39541 1.92
Deflation (D^) -7.70574 2.39283 3.22
Election (Dg) -8.73739 2.24571 3.89
Pause (D^) 8.84309 2.07656 4.26
r 2 = 0.98 r 2 ADJ. = 0. 9 7 N = 80
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.10
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ratios. For equation 16, the t-scores for each variable 
included showed improvement with the exception of the 
index of French employment which declined, yet remained 
significant. The results were much the same for equa­
tion 17. All t-scores improved except the ratio of French 
to British employment which decreased, but remained 
significant.
In other experiments, whose results are not shown, 
interest-rate differentials, lagged one-period were intro­
duced into equations 16 and 17. A slight improvement 
in the t-score of the interest rate variable resulted, 
but for the equation, and the Durbin-Watson ratio 
decreased. In addition, this lagged structure resulted 
in a general decrease in all t-scores and several vari­
ables became insignificant. While these experiments 
did not totally resolve the issue of the "best" lag struc­
ture for interest rates, based on better overall results, 
the unlagged form had greater appeal in the present study.
Preliminary Conclusions 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the following pre­
liminary conclusions are drawn:
During the period under study, the franc-pound exchange 
rate was strongly influenced by "fundamentals"— relative 
price levels, relative income levels and relative money 
stocks. The significance of these variables supports
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expectations based on economic theory. The very strong 
influence which relative price levels had on the exchange 
rate supports the notion that price incentives generate 
trade flows which produce countervailing exchange rate 
movements. The performance of the proxy variable for 
income levels suggests that the income elasticity of 
demand for foreign goods and services is both significant 
and positive. In ratio form, the money stock variable 
was significant indicating that the cash balance effect 
did influence the exchange rate. For reasons mentioned 
previously, interest-rate differentials were not expected 
to be significant and this was verified by the study.
While the influence of macrovariables was quite 
strong, the franc-pound exchange rate was not immune to 
forces emanating from the major social and political 
events of the day. Eight events were included in the 
analysis and of these, three were consistently signifi­
cant: the Laval "deflation" policies, the "election"
of the Popular Front party and the "pause" in the French 
Social reform movement. A fourth event, the "flights" 
from the franc was also found on several occasions to 
have significantly influenced the exchange rate. By 
creating the psychological atmosphere, these events appear 
to have caused inflows and flights of capital and/or 
stabilizing and destabilizing speculation.
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In general, the high degree of variability in the 
dollar price of sterling during the early 1920's 
appears to have reflected rather faithfully a high 
degree of variability in the "fundamentals."27
The study by Hudgins parallels closely in time the
present study. His focus was on fluctuations in the
dollar-pound rate from September 1931 through December
1938. While utilizing an analytical model similar to
Hodgson's, Hudgins included as independent variables
the exchange intervention activities of the U.S. and
British governments. A summary of these results is shown
in Table 4-10.28
Hudgins found both price ratios and employment ratios
significant with the expected sign. While both money
stock variables were significant, they carried signs
opposite to those predicted by theory. Hudgins argued
that this was the result of "inversed causality"--"that
the exchange rate was affecting variables (money stocks)
through speculative activity rather than vice versa, as
suggested by t h e o r y . "29 In concluding that "inversed
causality" was at work, Hudgins stated:
2^Hudgins, "Fluctuations," p. 256.
28Table 4-10 has been constructed from Hudgins, 
Table 4-4, p. 99. Only variables which had t-scores 
greater than 2.0 have been included.
2^Hudgins, "Fluctuations," p. 117.
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Seasonal variation did not emerge as an influence 
on the franc-pound rate. The trend variable was signifi­
cant in every experiment. This suggests several possi­
bilities: First, an explanatory variable may have been
omitted; second, taste patterns may have changed over 
the eight-year period; third, the increasing probability 
of war with Germany may have caused a slow deterioration 
in confidence regarding the continental European economies; 
fourth, the reluctance of France to leave the gold stan­
dard coupled with the inability of the French government 
to deal with the depression may have caused a secularly 
decreasing confidence in the franc which was not picked 
up by other variables; fifth, trend may have taken influ­
ence from variables with which it was correlated.
The intervention of the French Exchange Stabilization 
Fund did have a significant effect on the exchange rate.
To some extent then the French were successful in over­
riding the influences of fundamental and psychological 
forces affecting the exchange rate. While it cannot 
be denied that the FESF influenced the exchange rate, 
it is certainly not clear that their intervention was 
always in the best interests of the French economy. A 
more complete analysis of the effects of French and British 
intervention will follow in Chapter V.
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Comparison with the Results of Other Studies
In this section, the results obtained in the present 
study will be compared with those of similar studies 
by others.23
Hodgson analyzed fluctuations in the dollar-pound 
exchange rate from March 1919 to April 1925. The relation­
ship between the dollar and pound during this period 
was similar to that of the franc and pound during the 
period of the present study: the dollar was pegged to
gold, while the pound was not and the result was a "float­
ing" exchange rate between the two currencies. In his 
study, Hodgson developed the fundamental model for analysis 
which was later used (with modifications) by Thomas,
Hudgins and this writer.
Hodgson tested the influence of "fundamental" deter­
minants (price levels, real income levels, interest rate 
differentials, money stock magnitudes and seasonal effects) 
and nonfundamental events (political disruptions and random 
economic disturbances) on the level of the exchange rate.
23Reference is made to:
John S. Hodgson, "An Analysis of Floating-Exchange 
Rates: The Dollar-Sterling Rate, 1919-1925."
Maxwell Hudgins, "Currency Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
under a System of Stabilization Funds : The Case of the
Pound-Dollar Rate--1931-1938" (unpublished Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Virginia, 1973).
Lloyd B. Thomas, "Behavior of Flexible Exchange 
Rates: Additional Tests from the Post-World War I Episode."
106
Using an equation similar to equation 16 of this study, 
Hodgson obtained the results shown in Table 4 - 9 . As 
in the present study, Hodgson found "fundamentals," 
especially price levels to be highly significant in 
explaining the level of the exchange rate. In tests 
of nonfundamentals, two were significant ("restrictions") 
and "flight") and eleven others were not. The dummy 
variables representing "restrictions" and "flight" were 
intended to capture the effects of British restrictions 
on capital exports and certain specified imports and 
the flight from the pound in response to fears that the 
British government would abandon internal deflation 
p o l i c i e s . 25 Hodgson found interest rate differentials 
significant with the correct sign, but omitted real income 
proxies from his final f o r m . 26 Hodgson concluded:
2‘^Table 4-9 has been constructed without modifica­
tion of results from Hodgson, Table II, p. 252. T-scores 
were calculated using data contained in Table II and 
added to Table 4-9.
2^Hodgson, "Exchange Rates," p. 245 Fn.
26nodgson found the U.S. real-income variable insig­
nificant at the 0.05 level and although the British real- 
income variable was significant, it carried the wrong 
sign. Hodgson reasoned that this was not implausible 
given rising incomes of Britain's Commonwealth trading 
partners and a low supply elasticity of British exports 
with a high supply elasticity of British imports. Thus 
there was a rising demand for exports not associated 
with U.S. incomes which caused the pound to appreciate 
while British incomes were rising. Hodgson, "Exchange 
Rates," p. 253.
107
TABLE 4-9
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM HODGSON’S STUDY
OF THE DOLLAR-POUND RATE, 1919-1925
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Expected
Sign t-Score
Doliar-Pound Rate - - -
Constant 292.221 - 6.99
Price Index-US 1.292 + 8.28
Price Index-UK -1.158 - 12.19
R u s - ^ k  (Lagged 1-Period) 3.271 + 2.29
Mg-US (Lagged 1-Period) 2.406 + 3.12
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) -53.706 - 2.18
Si (Spring) -7.013 Unknown 2.35
S2 (Summer) -7.777 Unknown 2.41
S3 (Fall) -4.965 Unknown 1.61
D]^  (Restrictions) 19.222 + 2.37
Dg (Flight) 16.724 + 3.56
r 2 = 0.900 r 2 Ad]. = 0.884 N = 72
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.63
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TABLE 4-10 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM HUDGIN'S STUDY
OF THE DOLLAR-■POUND RATE, 1931-1938
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Expected
Sign t-Score
Dollar-Found Rate
Constant 8.38219 12.081
Price Index Ratio (UK/ 
US) (Lagged 1-Period) -2.04661 - 3.862
Employment Index Ratio 
(UK/US) (Lagged 1- 
Period)
Mg-UK (Lagged 1-Period) 0.00134 - 2.860
Mg-US (Lagged 1-Period) -0.00005 + 2.593
BEEA 0.10596 + 3.550
US on Gold Standard -0.740061 - 6.596
r 2 = 0.92024 r 2 Adj. = 0.90870
Durbin-VJatson Ratio = 0.7229
N = 88
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It is not the exchange rate itself that is causing 
the change in the money supply variables, but 
speculators' expectations as to the exchange rate.
In fact, a change in the money supply is in a sense 
acting as a proxy for the behavior of s p e c u l a t o r s . 30
In other experiments not shown here, Hudgins found
that when the interest rate differential was significant,
it carried the wrong sign. Hudgins explained this as
another case of "inversed causality"--"A change in the
exchange rate brought about by speculators' expectations
affected the money supply which in turn affected the
interest rate."31
Whereas Hodgson tested for trend influences and
found them insignificant, Hudgins ignored trend as an
influence. This could partially account for the low
Durbin-Watson ratios of Hudgins' s t u d y . 32
In testing for the influence of official intervention
by the British and American agencies, Hudgins found the
British Account was affecting the pound-dollar exchange
rate while the American Fund was not. This raised the
question of whether or not the activities of the British
Account constituted acts of "competitive depreciation."
30nudgins, "Fluctuations," p. 116.
^^Hudgins, "Fluctuations," pp. 117-18.
o 9
^Experiments in the present study omitting the 
trend dummy variable in equations 16 and 17 produced 
greatly reduced Durbin-Watson ratios with small decreases 
in r2.
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With further analysis, Hudgins concluded this was not 
the case.33
Of the "nonfundamental" events included in his 
analysis, only the effect of the U.S. being on the gold 
standard from August 1931 until April 1933 was significant 
in influencing the dollar-pound rate.
The conclusions reached by Hudgins would be in gen­
eral agreement with those of Hodgson--that the variability 
in the exchange rate appeared to be primarily the result 
of variability in the "fundamentals."
Thomas studied the exchange rate behavior of several 
pairs of currencies between 1920 and 1924. He was pri­
marily interested in determining the influence of funda­
mentals on the exchange rate and included only prices, 
incomes and interest rates in his original estimating 
equation. Thomas' results are summarized in Table 4-11.
Thomas found that relative prices were always signi­
ficant and carried the correct sign. The interest rate 
variable always carried the correct sign and in five 
of six instances was statistically significant. The 
income variable had the correct sign in five of six 
instances and was significant in three instances. In 
the light of the low Durbin-Watson ratios (suggesting 
the omission of other explanatory variables), Thomas
33nudgins, "Fluctuations," Chapter V.
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TABLE 4-11
SUMMARY OF THOMAS' STUDY OF SIX EXCHANGE RATES 
INVOLVING THE U.S. DOLLAR, 1920-1924
Exchange Pr (-) ir (+) Yr (-) r2 D.W.
U.S.-Canada -34.43
(-6.67)
35.88
(5.95)
10.92
(3.05)
0.755 0.501
U.S.-England -1.913
(-14.00)
0.271
(1.42)
-0.032
(-2.96)
0.887 0.705
U.S.-France -2.294
(-13.07)
8.012
(5.28)
-0.701
(-0.72)
0.834 0.909
U.S.-Netherlands -10.55
(-4.58)
4.332
(2.43)
-5.784
(-1 .68)
0.780 0.358
U.S.-Spain -6.240
(-4.84)
3.765
(2.80)
-0.966
(-1.17)
0.635 0.263
U.S.-Sweden -6.502
(-15.38)
2.313
(2.91)
-0.334
(-3.36)
0.894 0.673
NOTES; 1. =
■^US ; i f  = ^us ' ?r = ?us
Pother iother Yother
2, Signs in brackets to the right of ratios
are those theoretically expected.
3. Figures in parentheses below coefficients 
are t-statistics.
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added trend and seasonal dmnmy variables to his model.
This modification produced an improvement in the Durbin-
Watson ratio (i.e. reduced serial correlation of residuals)
and a general improvement in the statistical significance
of the fundamental economic factors.
Thomas thus tested indirectly for the influence of
speculative activities on the exchange rate and concluded
that because of low Durbin-Watson statistics the standard
errors of the parameter estimates were biased and that
. . . support for the hypothesis that fundamental 
influences were the dominating factors impinging 
upon the exchanges is not as firm as would be the 
case if autocorrelation in the residuals was insigni­
ficant. On balance, however, the results seem suf­
ficiently consistent and persuasive to raise serious 
question concerning the validity of the hypothesis 
that speculation was the predominant influence upon 
the exchanges. In those equations in which auto­
correlation is not highly severe (D.W. 1.1) the 
degree of statistical association between the exchange 
rate and the fundamental factors is extremely s t r o n g . 35
The results of the present study are consistent with
these earlier studies and serve to increase the strength
of the argument that when currencies are not subject to
34por the six exchange rates under study, the Durbin- 
Watson ratios after adding trend and seasonal dummy vari­
ables to the basic model were:
Exchange Rate Durbin-Watson Ratio
U.S.-Canada 0.924 1.269
U.S.-England 0.925 1.021
U.S.-France 0.877 1.261
U.S.-Netherlands 0.888 0.962
U.S.-Spain 0.859 1.142
U.S.-Sweden 0.900 0.672
^^Thomas, "Exchange Rates," p. 174.
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rigid pegging either to gold pars or governmental imposed 
parities, the degree of statistical association between 
the exchange rate and economic fundamentals, especially 
relative prices, is very strong.
A major difference in the present and earlier studies 
arises when account is taken of the effects of nonfunda­
mental events. Both Hodgson and Hudgins found that these 
"nonfundamentals" had minimal effect on the exchange 
rate during their period of study. In the present analysis, 
nonfundamental events were found to influence the franc- 
pound exchange rate on several occasions. This indicates 
that while the franc-pound rate was primarily influenced 
by fundamentals, it had a greater "underlying instability" 
than did the dollar-pound rate.
A preliminary conclusion based on the present study 
is that floating currency exchange rates will be predom­
inately influenced by economic fundamentals but they will 
be susceptible to the effects of nonfundamental events.
The greater the "underlying instability" of the economy, 
the greater will be the influence of these nonfundamental 
events. Since the dollar-pound rate proved to be more 
immune to such events than did the franc-pound rate, it 
seems plausible to look for an explanation in differences 
between France and the United States during this period.
Since it is not the intention of this study to exhaus­
tively compare the American and French economies during
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the 1930's, the above argument can perhaps be made clear 
by quickly comparing the countries with regard to their 
general economic strength, political stability and exposure 
to war threats. In each instance one would be led to 
conclude that the "underlying instability" was much greater 
in France. The relative degree to which floating exchange 
rates follow economic fundamentals appears to depend on 
how immune the currencies are to nonfundamental events, 
that is, the degree of underlying instability of the 
countries.
On this basis then, floating exchange rates would 
be most appropriate (based on the criteria that they 
should reflect changes in economic fundamentals) between 
countries which exhibit stable political, military, social 
and economic environments.
Since intervention activity by official sources had 
a statistically significant influence on the franc-pound 
rate, the effect of their activity on the terms of trade, 
trade and employment patterns between the two countries 
will be studied in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STABILIZATION FUNDS
In Chapter II, the development and purposes of the 
BEEA and FESF were presented. It was shown that the 
attention of both intervention agencies was directed 
totally to the exchange rate apparently without regard 
to other possible effects of their activities. In the 
case of the BEEA, the stated intent was to smooth out 
wide fluctuations in the exchange rate, but not to oppose 
movements resulting from changes in fundamental economic 
variables while the FESF operated to maintain the exchange 
rate within "bands."
The results of the empirical investigation presented 
in Chapter IV indicated that the accounts, notably the 
FESF, did affect the month-to-month level of the exchange 
rate. Since the BEEA did not influence the rate, it could 
be concluded that it operated according to stated objectives
By focusing their total attention on the exchange 
rate, both intervention agencies ignored the movement 
in a variable closely related to the exchange rate--the
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terms of trade. The thesis of the present chapter is 
that the BEEA and FESF on many occasions acted in a manner 
that produced "destabilizing” movements in the terms of 
trade. Assuming that a country's imports and exports 
are influenced by the terms of trade and further that 
domestic employment levels are influenced by the export 
surplus, then a relationship between exchange rate inter­
vention and employment levels can be postulated. It is 
the purpose of this Chapter to investigate the relationship 
(if any) which existed between exchange rate intervention 
by the BEEA and FESF and the export surplus of the U.K. 
and France.
The usual justification made for fixed or stabilized 
exchange rates is that they reduce the amount of uncer­
tainty facing traders and thus stimulate trade. It is 
further argued that adjustment costs are reduced under 
a system of fixed rates.^
Judgment as to the desirability of an economic activ­
ity should be based on a sterner test however, cost- 
benefit analysis. It is contended in this study that 
the activity of the BEEA and FESF was undertaken without
Exchange rate changes effectively change the price 
of every good and service in the two countries. It can 
be argued that exchange rate induced changes in relative 
prices can have dysfunctional effects on domestic employ­
ment and investment as large or frequent shifts in demand 
occur.
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regard to effects on variables other than the level of 
the exchange rate.
Considering only the benefits derived from the reduc­
tion of uncertainty facing traders and the reduction in 
adjustment costs, intervention might be justified. The 
failure to recognize the effects of exchange intervention 
on the terms of trade ignores some significant costs of 
that activity. By taking account of intervention activity 
on not only the exchange rate, but on the terms of trade, 
the export surplus and domestic employment, manipulation 
of the exchange rate may be cast in a different light.
The investigation will proceed as follows: First,
the effect of exchange rate intervention on the terms of 
trade between the U.K. and France will be analyzed. 
Following this, an empirical study will be made to deter­
mine the influence of the terms of trade on the export 
surplus of France (import surplus of the U.K.) Based 
on these results conclusions will be drawn regarding 
the efficacy of exchange rate intervention.
As used in this chapter, terms of trade (TOT) is 
defined :
2
1. TOT =
Puk ER
The reader will recognize this as a form of the 
net barter terms of trade. In the strict sense, the 
prices of imported and exported goods and services should 
be used. Since no series of import and export prices
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where :
P£ = An index of the prices of French 
goods and services.
Puk “ index of the prices of UK goods 
and services.
ER = The exchange rate expressed in francs 
per pound.
The TOT may change from month to month for the following 
reasons :
1. Relative prices change and this change is not 
fully compensated by an induced change in the 
exchange rate.^
2. Relative prices remain stable while the exchange
rate changes.
is available for either France or Britain, general whole­
sale price levels were substituted as proxies. The net 
barter terms of trade is defined as index of export prices 
divided by an index of import prices with both expressed 
in the same currency units. In this case, the price 
of French imports was converted from pounds to francs by 
multiplying by the exchange rate. For a complete dis­
cussion of the net barter terms of trade (as well as other 
terms of trade concepts), see Clement, Pfister and Rothwell, 
Theoretical Issues in International Economics (Boston: 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1967), Chapter 3.
According to theory, a change in relative prices 
would cause changes in the supply and demand for foreign 
exchange and therefore in the exchange rate. For example, 
if French prices increase while U.K. prices remain stable, 
to the degree that goods in the two countries were substi­
tutable, consumers would buy larger quantities of U.K. goods 
and smaller quantities of French goods. In the exchange 
market this would result in an increase in the demand for 
pounds and a decrease in the supply of pounds. The franc 
would depreciate relative to the pound and the exchange 
rate increase, offsetting to some extent the difference in 
relative prices and reducing the demand for U.K. goods.
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Looking at the effects of exchange market inter­
vention on the TOT, intervention can be categorized as 
either "stabilizing" or "destabilizing" according to 
the following definitions:
Stabilizing Intervention: If in a given period,
the activity of either fund was such that the TOT of 
the period was closer to the "normal" level than would 
have been the case had the fund not intervened, then 
the intervention had a stabilizing effect on trade.
Destabilizing Intervention: If in a given period,
the activity of either fund was such that the TOT for that 
period deviated further from the "normal" level than would 
have been the case had the fund not intervened, then the 
intervention had a destabilizing effect on trade. Desta­
bilizing intervention could take either of two forms, 
"predatory" or "masochistic." "Predatory" destabilizing 
intervention would result when intervention by either 
country caused a movement in the TOT away from the "normal" 
level in favor of the country which intervened. "Maso­
chistic" destabilizing intervention would result when the 
intervening country caused a movement in the TOT away 
from the "normal" level but disfavoring the intervening 
country.^
The use of the words "predatory" and "masochistic" 
requires clarification. In this study it is the effect 
of a change in the terms of trade on employment and income
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These definitions raise the question: "What is
the 'normal' level of the TOT?" Since this "normal" 
level is the basis for evaluating the effects of exchange 
rate intervention, the definition chosen will have a 
large impact on the conclusions drawn. Three possible 
definitions are suggested and discussed below:
Assumption 1 : The "normal" level of the TOT is
that which prevailed in the immediate past period. This 
implies that traders adjust quickly to changes in the 
TOT and therefore consider the most recent conditions to 
be the "normal" conditions. If the TOT of the period 
under consideration is different from that of the immediate 
past period, traders would quickly respond to these changed 
conditions. The appeal of such a definition of "normal" 
level is diminished by problems in testing its validity.
For any given period the data available for trade flows 
between countries is an estimate of the money value of 
goods and services which actually moved across national 
boundaries during the period. Goods and services which 
move from one country to another during a given period 
are likely the result of orders placed during that period
which is being considered. If activity by the FESF results 
in a situation whereby British goods and services become 
less expensive to the French consumer, then it can be 
argued that they (French consumers) are better off as a 
result. The effects of this intervention on the French 
export surplus (decreases) and French employment (decreases) 
cause the label "masochistic" exchange market intervention 
to be applied to such activity.
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and past periods as well. Especially in the case of 
manufactured goods, one could expect that such goods which 
are measured in a given period were the result of pur­
chases made as a result of conditions which existed in 
past periods. Thus a lag structure can be safely assumed 
to exist between incentives to engage in trade and measure­
ment of trade flows resulting from the incentives.
Assumption 2 : The "normal" level of the TOT is a
weighted average of past periods' TOT. This implies 
that trade flows adjust more slowly to changes in the 
TOT and is more consistent with the reality that measured 
trade flows in any period are the result of conditions 
prevailing in that period as well as immediate past 
periods. The major appeal of this definition then is 
that it is more consistent with the reported data on 
trade flows.
Assumption 3 : The "normal" level of the TOT is deter­
mined by the long run trend in the TOT.^ The basic appeal 
of such a definition of "normal" is that it recognizes 
that deviations away from a long run trend are the result
The linear time trend for the TOT was generated 
by assuming that the observed TOT for any period (t) 
was a function of time. Using ordinary least squares 
regression, the following regression equation was obtained:
TOT (t) = 0.05913 - 0.00018 (t)
(0 . 00002)
= 0.55233 D.W. = 0.35
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of either artificially imposed restrictions (e.g. exchange 
rate interventions, price controls, tariffs, quotas, or 
embargos) or insufficient time for a complete response to 
market signals. On the negative side, the assumption of a 
linear trend in the "normal" TOT implies that such variables 
as tastes, productivity and technology are changing at a 
uniform rate, and this is truly an heroic assumption.
In the following section, the intervention activity 
of the BEEA and the FESF is analyzed using each of the 
above three assumptions regarding the "normal" level. 
Intervening activity will be categorized as either "stabil­
izing" or "destabilizing." VJhen intervention is deemed 
to be destabilizing, it will be further classified as 
either "predatory" or "masochistic."
An Evaluation of Exchange Market Intervention 
For the period of the study, the actual TOT have 
been calculated for each month according to equation 1 .
These results are shown in Table 5-1 in index number form 
using October 1931 as the base period.
Table 5-2 compares the TOT for period (t) with the 
TOT for period (t-1) . This index number series is gener­
ated utilizing Assumption 1 (the "normal" level of the 
TOT is the level which prevailed in the immediate past 
period). The index numbers represent ratios and may 
be interpreted as follows: If the ratio is greater than
TABLE 5-1
TOT INDEX NUMBERS 
(October 1931 = 1.00)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.01 0.99 0.95 0.75
Feb 1.10 1.05 1.09 1.00 1.03 0.93 0.74
Mar 1.05 1.02 1.10 1.08 1.04 0.92 0.73
Apr 1.02 1.02 1.07 0.99 1.02 0.89 0.74
May 1.06 1.02 1.08 1.00 1.03 0.85
Jun 1.05 1.04 1.07 0.95 1.02 0.86
Jul 1.09 1.03 1.07 0.93 1.04 0.77
Aug 1.06 1.03 1.04 0.95 1.06 0.78
Sep 1.03 1.06 1.05 0.93 1.09 0.78
Oct 1.00 1.06 1.07 1.04 0.96 0.87 0.73
Nov 1.01 1.11 1.07 1.02 0.97 0.91 0.74
Dec 1.10 1.10 1.05 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.76
TABLE 5-2
INDEX NUMBER SERIES 
TOT (t)/TOT (t-1)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0.97 0.97 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.02 0.99
Feb 1.03 0.98 1.03 0.99 1.04 0.98 0.99
Mar 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.08 1.01 0.99 0.99
Apr 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.97 1.01
May 1.04 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.96
Jun 0.99 1.02 0.99 0.95 0.99 1.01
Jul 1.04 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.02 0.90
Aug 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.02 1.01
Sep 0.97 1.03 1.01 0.97 1.03 1 . 00
Oct 1.03 1.01 0.99 1.03 0.80 0.94
Nov 1.01 1.05 1.00 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.01
Dec 1.09 0.99 0.98 0.97 1.02 1.02 1.03
N)
Ln
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1.0, then the present period TOT is larger than the immedi­
ate past period TOT. An increase in the value of the TOT 
in period (t) relative to period (t-1) would create price 
incentives for increased French imports from the U.K. and 
decreased French exports to the U.K. When the ratio is 
less than 1 .0 , the opposite situation occurs and incentives 
are created favoring decreased French imports and increased 
French exports. When the ratio is 1.0, there is no change 
in price incentives resulting from the TOT.
Of primary interest is the effect which exchange 
market intervention had on the TOT and therefore presumably 
on French exports and imports. Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 
show the effects of intervention on the TOT by the BEEA 
and FESF respectively.
For example, in July 1932, the French intervened 
in the exchange market, buying pounds to mitigate a fall 
in the franc-pound rate.& A priori then it can be con­
cluded that the franc-pound rate would have been lower 
and the TOT for that period higher in the absence of 
intervention. Thus the intervention activity of the 
French in July 1932 was stabilizing in that it prevented 
a movement further away from the "normal" level (according 
to Assumption 1 of the TOT. Table 5-4 shows that inter­
vention by the French in July 1932 was stabilizing (abbre­
viated "S" in the table).
^The Economist, July 30, 1932, p. 211.
TABLE 5-3
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - BEEA
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan S DP S
Feb S S
Mar S DP DP S
Apr DM DM
May S DP S S
Jun DP S DM DM
Jul S DP S
Aug S S S
Sep DP S S S
Oct DM DP
Nov S
Dec S
NO
' ~ J
TABLE 5-4
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - FESF
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan DM S DP
Feb S DP
Mar S DP
Apr D DP
May DM S
Jun S
Jul S DM D
Aug S
Sep DP S
Oct S
Nov S DM
Dec S DM
00
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The next period in which intervention occurred was 
September 1932. Again it was the French buying pounds 
to mitigate a fall in the franc-pound rate.^ The TOT 
for this period was 3% below the ''normal'' level (see 
Table 5-2). The activity of the French caused the franc- 
pound rate to be higher and TOT lower than would have 
been the case in the absence of intervention. Thus the 
intervention activity by the French in September 1932 
was destabilizing in that it caused a movement away from 
the "normal" level of the TOT.
Since the intervention by the French also produced 
a trade situation which was more favorable to themselves 
(French commodities became cheaper to the British),
Table 5-4 indicates that it was destabilizing and preda­
tory (abbreviated "DP").
An example of intervention which was destabilizing 
and masochistic occurred in October 1934. Table 5-2 
shows that the TOT for this period was below the "normal" 
level. The British intervened in the exchange market, 
selling francs to mitigate a fall in the franc-pound 
rate.8 The effect of their activity was to cause the 
exchange rate to be higher and the TOT lower than would 
have been the case in the absence of intervention. This
^The Economist, September 17, 1932, p. 993. 
^The Economist, October 13, 1934, p. 685.
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constituted an act of destabilizing intervention because 
the activity of the British caused the TOT to move away 
from the "normal" level.
Since TOT below the "normal" level favors French 
trade rather than British trade (French commodities become 
cheaper to the British), the intervention by the British 
was also masochistic. For October 1934, Table 5-4 shows 
that British intervention was destabilizing and masochistic 
(abbreviated "DM").
Table 5-5 presents a month-by-month summary evalu­
ation of intervention by the BEEA and FESF based on Assump­
tion 1 and the previously defined criteria ("stabilizing," 
"destabilizing," "predatory" and "masochistic").
Using the same methodology, intervention activity 
was analyzed under the two alternative assumptions regard­
ing the definition of the "normal" level of the TOT.
Tables 5-6, 5-7, 5-8 and 5-9 were constructed based 
on Assumption 2 (the "normal" level was an average of 
the three previous months' TOT). Thus Table 5-6 is an 
index number series comparing the TOT for period (t) 
with the arithmetic average of the TOT for the periods 
(t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). Table 5-7 and Table 5-8 show 
the effects of BEEA and FESF intervention respectively 
and were constructed using the same criteria as that 
used in constructing Tables 5-3 and 5-4. A month-by-month
TABLE 5-5
SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY BY BEEA AND FESF (ASSUMPTION NO. 1)
Number
of
Interventions*
Number of 
Stabilizing 
Interventions
Number of 
Destabilizing 
Interventions
Destabilizing
Predatory
Interventions
Destabilizing
Masochistic
Interventions
BEEA 33 20 13 8 5
FESF 23 11 12 7 5
TOTAL 56 31 25 15 10
UJ
''Number of interventions equals the number 
different months during which the agency- 
intervened in the exchange market between 
August 1931 and April 1938 (a period of 
81 months)
of
TABLE 5-6
INDEX NUMBER SERIES 
TOT (t)/(AVERAGE OF PAST 3-MONTHS TOT)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.01
Feb 0.96 1.03 0.99 1.04 1.00 0.99
Mar 0.95 1.03 1.08 1.04 0.99 0.98
Apr 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.96 0.99
May 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.94
Jun 1.02 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.97
Jul 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.02 0.89
Aug 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.99 1.03 0.94
Sep 0.97 1.03 0.99 0.99 1.04 0.97
Oct 1.00 1.03 0.98 1.02 0.82 0.94
Nov 1.05 1.02 0.97 1.03 0. 90 0.97
Dec 1.03 0.99 0.96 1.04 0.98 1.01
(jO
to
TABLE 5-7
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - BEEA
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan S S S
Feb S S
Mar S DP DP S
Apr S DM
May DM S DM S
Jun DP S DM S
Jul S DM S
Aug S S S
Sep S S S DM
Oct DM DP
Nov S
Dec S
W
W
TABLE 5-8
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - FESF
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan S S S
Feb S S
Mar S DC
Apr S DC
May S S
Jun DC
Jul S DC DC
Aug DC
Sep DC DC
Oct S
Nov DC S
Dec DC S
w
■P'
TABLE 5-9
SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY BY BEEA AND FESF (ASSUMPTION NO. 2)
Number
of
Interventions*
Number of 
Stabilizing 
Interventions
Number of 
Destabilizing 
Interventions
Destabilizing
Predatory
Interventions
Destabilizing
Masochistic
Interventions
BEEA 33 22 11 4 7
FESF 23 13 10 10 0
TOTAL 56 35 21 14 7
U)
Lfl
*Number of interventions equals the number of 
different months during which the agency 
intervened in the exchange market between 
August 1931 and April 1938 (a period of 
81 months).
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summary evaluation of intervention based on Assumption 2 
is presented in Table 5-9.
Finally, using Assumption 3 (the "normal" level is 
determined by a linear time trend), Tables 5-10, 5-11,
5-12 and 5-13 were constructed. Table 5-10 compares the 
TOT for period (t) with the linear trend line for TOT.
BEEA and FESF intervention are shown and evaluated in 
Tables 5-11, 5-12 and 5-13.
A summary of the results obtained using the three 
different assumptions regarding the "normal" level of the 
TOT is shown in Table 5-14. These summary results were 
derived from Tables 5-5, 5-9 and 5-13.
The interesting feature demonstrated in Table 5-14 
is the similarity in the results obtained using the three 
different assumptions regarding the "normal" level of 
the TOT. Looking only at intervention as stabilizing 
or destabilizing and ignoring for the moment whether 
destabilizing intervention was predatory or masochistic, 
the choice of definition for the "normal" level had little 
effect on the evaluation of BEEA intervention. BEEA 
intervention was analyzed as stabilizing 61-67% of the 
time and destabilizing 33-39% of the time depending on 
the reference criteria (Table 5-14, columns 1 and 2).
The FESF activity on the other hand shows a somewhat 
higher percentage of destabilizing interventions and a 
higher degree of variability. Intervention by the French
TABLE 5-10
INDEX NUMBER SERIES 
TOT (t)/TOT Trend
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.06 1.05 0.88
Feb 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.02 1.10 1.04 0.87
Mar 0.95 0.97 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.03 0.86
Apr 0.93 0.96 1.06 1.02 1.10 1.00 0.87
May 0.97 0.97 1.07 1.03 1.11 0.96
Jun 0.97 0.99 1.06 0.99 1.10 0.98
Jul 1.00 0.99 1.07 0.97 1.14 0.88
Aug 0.98 0.99 1.04 0.99 1.16 0.89
Sep 0. 96 1.02 1.06 0.98 1.18 0.90
Oct 0.90 0.99 1.04 1.05 1.00 0.96 0.84
Nov 0.91 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.00 0.85
Dec 0.99 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.04 1.03 0.88
CO
TABLE 5-11
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - BEEA
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan S DP S
Feb DP S
Mar S DP DP S
Apr S S
May DM DP S S
Jun S DP S S
Jul DP DM S
Aug DP S S
Sep DP s S DM
Oct S s
Nov s
Dec s
w
00
TABLE 5-12
ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY - FESF
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan DM S DP
Feb DM DP
Mar S DP
Apr S S
May DM S
Jun DP
Jul S DP DP
Aug DP
Sep DP DP
Oct S
Nov S S
Dec S S
w
TABLE 5-13
SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY BY BEEA AND FESF (ASSUMPTION NO. 3)
Number Number of Number of Destabilizing Destabilizing
of Stabilizing Destabilizing Predatory Masochistic
Interventions* Interventions Interventions Interventions Interventions
BEEA 33 21 12 9 3
FESF 23 11 12 9 3
TOTAL 56 33 24 18 6
O
“Number of interventions equals the number of 
different months during which the agency 
intervened in the exchange market between 
August 1931 and April 1938 (a period of 
81 months).
TABLE 5-14
FINAL SUMMARY OF INTERVENTION ACTIVITY BY BEEA AND FESF
BEEA I n t e r v e n t i o n F E S F  I n t e r v e n t i o n
(I)
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agency was analyzed as stabilizing 48-57% of the time and 
destabilizing 43-52% of the time depending again on the 
reference criteria (Table 5-14, columns 5 and 6).
Considering the breakdown of destabilizing inter­
ventions into the categories "predatory" and "masochistic," 
Table 5-14 shows that the BEEA intervention when destabil­
izing was predatory 12-37% of the time and masochistic 
9-21% of the time while FESF's intervention showed even 
greater variability, being predatory 30-43% of the time 
and masochistic 0-22% of the time.
Interpreting these findings in the broadest sense, 
it can be concluded that intervention tended to be desta­
bilizing approximately one-third of the time when under­
taken by the French. Further, when intervention was 
destabilizing, it was usually predatory in nature. Only 
in the case of the BEEA using Assumption 2 was a larger 
proportion of intervention considered masochistic as 
opposed to predatory.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, the alleged 
benefits of stabilized exchange rates must be discounted 
somewhat. If official intervention to smooth the exchange 
rate produces as a concomitant effect destabilization 
in the TOT leading to changes in a nation's export surplus 
and employment levels, then the desirability of such 
intervention should perhaps be re-examined.
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It remains to be shown, however, that the level of 
the TOT had a significant influence on trade between 
the U.K. and France. The argument therefore must shift 
from the realm of a priori to that of a posteriori. In 
the following section, then, the relationship between 
the TOT and the export surplus of France will be examined.
Time-Series Estimation of the 
French Export Surplus
In this section, the influence of the TOT on the 
French export surplus with the U.K. will be examined.
The foundation of the statistical research which follows 
is a hypothesized behavioral relationship between the 
level of imports and exports of goods and services and 
several explanatory variables.^ Whereas in Chapters III 
and IV the relationship between the demand and supply 
of foreign exchange and various explanatory variables 
was examined, the focus now turns to the demand for foreign 
goods and services by the French and British. In particu­
lar, it is trade between France and the U.K. which is of 
interest, since it is being hypothesized that exchanged 
market intervention influenced the level of the TOT and 
therefore trade flows between the two countries.
^The analysis in this section draws liberally on 
the work of Leamer and Stearn, Quantitative International 
Economics, Chapter 2.
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Analytical Framework
The theory of demand suggests that the quantity
demanded of good x is a function of its price, the price
of other goods, consumers' incomes, tastes, expectations
and seasonal influences as well as other less important
variables. In terms of the demand by UK residents for
the goods and services of F (i.e. F . exports to the UK):
2. X£ - f Puk> ^uk’ Tr%, S%)
ER
where
X£ = The quantity of F goods and services 
demanded by residents of UK.
?£ = The F currency price of goods and
services exported from F.
ER = The exchange rate; the price of UK 
currency in terms of F currency.
^uk = An index of the income level in UK.
Tr^ = A trend index.
= A seasonal index.
Residents of F can also be assumed to have a demand 
for foreign goods and services. Their demand for the 
goods and services of UK (i.e. F imports from UK) can 
be expressed:
3. M£ = f (Puk ' ^f> ^f> Tr^ |, Sjjj)
where
M£ = The quantity of UK goods and services 
demanded by residents of F.
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Pi = The UK price of goods and services 
exported from UK.
ER = The exchange rate; the price of UK
currency in terms of F currency.
Y£ = An index of the income level in F.
Tr^ = A trend index.
Sjjj = A seasonal index.
According to the theory of income and employment 
determination which has evolved from the ideas of Keynes, 
expenditures for foreign trade constitute a part of a 
country's aggregate demand and thus affect income, output 
and therefore employment according to the relationship 
between exports and imports. Theory thus suggests that 
the export surplus (exports minus imports) will have a 
direct effect on domestic employment. An excess of exports 
over imports indicates that foreign spending for domestic 
goods exceeds domestic spending for foreign goods. A 
positive export surplus (exports exceed imports) thus 
stimulates domestic employment at the expense of foreign 
employment.
For the purpose of this study, the relationship 
between the TOT and the French export surplus with UK 
is desired. The export surplus can be derived by combining 
equations 2 and 3 above:
4. (X - M)f = f (Pf, • ER, Yuk, Yf,
Tr, S)
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where
Tr = A trend index.
S = A seasonal index.
All other variables are as previously defined.
Assuming that the relationship in euqation 4 is
linear, the model will take the following form:
5. (X - M)^ = Bg + ^ ____  + 6 2 ^uk ^ +
^uk"
Tr + 3^ S2 + By + u
where
^f  = The net barter terms of trade (TOT)
Py^.ER between F and UK.
S%, S2 , Sg = Seasonal dummy variables repre­
senting spring, summer and 
fall respectively.
An alternative form of equation 5 which conserves
one degree of freedom is:
6. (X - M) £ = 3q + B]_ P £ + 3 2 Yf d- 3 2 Tr +
^uk■ ^uk
34 S2 + 35 S3 + Bg S3 + y
where
^f = A ratio of the indices of income 
levels in F and UK.
All other variables are as previously 
defined.
Using implicit differentiation, the predictions of 
the signs of the coefficients in equations 5 and 6 were 
determined. The results are shown in Table 5-15.
TABLE 5-15
PREDICTED SIGNS OF COEFFICIENTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Equation 5 Equation 6
Variable Sign Variable Sign
TOT
Yf (Lagged) 
Yuk (Lagged) 
Trend
Sf (Spring) 
Sg (Summer) 
S3 (Fall)
+
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
TOT
Yf/Yuk (Lagged) 
Trend
Sf (Spring)
83 (Summer)
S3 (Fall)
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
4>
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Data on trade between France and the U.K. were not 
reported on a monthly basis during the period 1931-1938. 
Total French and British exports and imports were available 
in a monthly time series reported in the Trade Supplement 
of The Economist. Since these data were aggregated to 
include not just trade between France and the U.K., but 
trade with all of the trading partners of both countries, 
it was determined that such data would be inadequate 
for the purposes of this study. A time series for French- 
U.K. trade on a quarterly basis was reported by the British 
House of C o m m o n s . B e g i n n i n g  with the 4th quarter of 
1931 and ending with the 2nd quarter of 1938, twenty-seven 
observations on trade between France and the U.K. were 
collected.
The reported data for U.K. exports to and imports 
from France are in value terms (pounds). Leamer and 
Stearn suggest that quantity of imports (or exports) 
is the appropriate dependent v a r i a b l e . T o  generate 
a time series of real net exports, the difference between 
U.K. imports from and exports to France were divided 
by the U.K. wholesale price index for the corresponding
^^Great Britain, House of Commons Papers, Trade and 
Navigation (United Kingdom), Vol. 52 (XVII-XXVlT^ 1931- 
19387
^^Leamer and Stearn, Economics, p. 8 .
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p e r i o d . ^2 The real net exports data are included in 
Table B-1, Appendix B.
Quarterly data for the franc-pound exchange rate, 
and French and British price and income levels were gener­
ated by averaging the appropriate months from the available 
monthly time series for these variables. Since a lag 
structure between measured trade flows and explanatory 
variables appeared appropriate, two different sets of 
time series data were constructed for the TOT and income 
variables. First, the quarterly series were calculated 
with no lag structure assumed. Tables B-2, B-3 and B-4 
in Appendix B show quarterly averages for TOT, U.K. and 
French income levels respectively. Second, a one-month 
lag was assumed to exist between net exports (as measured) 
and TOT and income levels. Tables B-5, B-6 and B-7 in 
Appendix B show quarterly averages lagged one-month for 
TOT, U.K. and French income levels respectively.
The seasonal dummy variables, S^, S2 and S3 correspond 
to the first, second and third quarters of the year and 
are shown in Table B-8 . The trend variable is simply 
a series of sequential integers, 1-27.
1 O
The value of imports and exports was expressed 
in pounds, making it appropriate to deflate by the U.K. 
price index.
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Empirical Results
Using ordinary least squares regression techniques, 
equations 5 and 6 were estimated. The results for the 
initial estimation of equation 5 are shown in Table 5-16.
Of the seven explanatory variables included in 
equation 5 only one, the dummy variable (representing 
the second quarter of the year April-June), was significant. 
The TOT, French employment and British employment variables 
all carried the correct sign but were not significant.
As mentioned previously, trade data which was avail­
able was in measured exports and imports. Because of the 
probable lag between the incentives leading to the purchase 
of a foreign good and the measurement of the transfer 
of good, some lag structure would be expected to exist 
between the TOT and incomes (incentives) and trade flows 
(measured responses).
Assuming that some lagged relationship was more 
appropriate, a second estimation of equation 5 was made.
The results obtained from lagging the TOT and income 
variables one-month are shown in Tables 5-17.
The one-month lagged relationship produced a signifi­
cant improvement in the results: All t-scores were improved,
as was the and Durbin-Watson ratio. Of the seven vari­
ables only the seasonal variables and S3 remained 
insignificant. The TOT, French income and British income 
variables carried the correct signs and were significant
TABLE 5-16 
INITIAL ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 5
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Export Surplus-France
Constant -125.70598 197.805 0.63
TOT -231.37748 1036.18705 0.22
Employment Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) -0.07075 0.19555 0.36
Employment Index-UK 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.24670 0.17639 1.40
Trend -2.25585 2.33233 0.97
Si (Spring) -7.71771 7.62000 1.01
S2 (Summer) -17.04687 6.95905 2.45
S3 (Fall) -10.65334 7.28083 1.46
r 2 = 0.34 r 2 ADJ. = 0 . 2 9 N = 27
Ln
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.03
TABLE 5-17
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 5 WITH LAGGED TOT
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Export Surplus-France
Constant 143.26585 180.30200 0.79
TOT (Lagged 1-Period) -0.21196 0.08897 2.38
Employment Index-France 
(Lagged 1-Period) -0.33990 0.17329 1.96
Employment Index-UK 
(Lagged 1-Period) 0.33854 0.15114 2.24
Trend -4.70099 1.91353 2.46
Si (Spring) -10.69219 6.77228 1.58
S2 (Summer) -15.80290 6.12305 2.58
S3 (Fall) -6.84058 6.50485 1.05
= 0.49 r 2 a d j . = 0 . 4 4 N = 27
Ln
K)
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.32
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at the 5% level. The trend variable and the dummy variable 
S2 were also significant. The negative sign of the trend 
variable indicates that other forces operating with a 
trend effect were working to the detriment of French trade.
Equation 6 was also estimated using the lag structure 
discussed above. The results are shown in Table 5-18.
The introduction of the income variables in ratio form 
not only conserved one degree of freedom, but led to 
improved results in R^, Durbin-Watson ratio and the t-scores 
of all explanatory variables. Of the six variables, only 
the dummy variable S3 (October-December) was not signifi­
cant at the 57o level. The TOT and relative income vari­
ables carried the correct sign and were significant. The 
trend variable and dummy variable 83 remained significant 
and dummy variable S]_ (January-March) became significant 
as a result of the modified format.
The results obtained in the estimation of equations 5 
and 6 were consistent: In both cases, the TOT (lagged
one-month) had a significant influence on the French 
export surplus. Further, the relationship obtained through 
the empirical testing verified the a priori contention 
that decreases in the French export surplus variable were 
associated with increases in the level of the TOT variable 
(lagged one-month). Thus conditions causing an increase 
in the TOT appear to have generated a decrease in the 
French export surplus and according to Keynesian theory
TABLE 5-18
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION 6 WITH LAGGED TOT
Variable
Regression
Coefficient
Standard
Deviation t-Score
Export Surplus-France
Constant 532.08918 174.84200 3.04
TOT (Lagged 1-Period) -0.25037 0.08241 3.04
Employment Index Ratio 
(Fyk Lagged 1-Period) -371.80177 138.01006 2.69
Trend -4.73797 1.76024 2.69
Si (Spring) -11.65190 5.88682 1.98
S2 (Summer) -15.75384 5.85348 2.69
S3 (Fall) -6.21832 6.23596 1.00
r 2 = 0.50 r 2 ADJ. = 0 . 4 6 N = 27
Durbin-Watson Ratio = 1.41
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would have a negative effect on income and employment 
in France.
Summary
A close examination of the intervention activity 
of the BEEA and FESF during the period 1931-1938 reveals 
that an unintended result of their policies (designed 
to stabilize the franc-pound exchange rate) was the 
destabilization of the TOT.
Further, when destabilizing intervention resulted, 
it was predominantly "predatory" in nature, i.e. inter­
vention by an agency resulted in a movement in the TOT 
which favored exports and employment in the country of 
the intervening agency at the expense of its trading 
partner.
An empirical investigation supported the theoretical 
conclusion that trade flows were responsive to the level 
of the TOT as well as other variables. In the case of 
trade between France and the U.K. the evidence indicated 
that the level of the French export surplus was strongly 
influenced by the level of the TOT.
The BEEA and FESF could therefore be accused of 
engaging in activities in the exchange market which had 
severe repercussions beyond those intended. The seemingly 
simple act of smoothing out undue fluctuations in the 
exchange rate, or holding the rate between "bands"
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conceivably produced detrimental effects on income and 
employment. To claim that these effects were unintended 
does not diminish their significance.
In the larger view, the results of this historical 
study cast doubt over the efficacy of official exchange 
rate intervention. It seems possible, even likely, that 
when cognizance is taken of the "larger picture" (the 
effects of intervention on TOT, income levels and employ­
ment) , the costs of exchange rate stabilization may far 
outweigh its benefits.
CHAPTER VI
CSUMMARY AND CONCLUSION^
This study was an investigation of the fluctuations 
in the franc-pound exchange rate from August 1931 through 
April 1938 with special emphasis on the effects of the 
operations of the French and British exchange stabiliza­
tion funds during this period.
In general, the results of this investigation reinforce 
the theory that exchange rate movements follow broad move­
ments in the appropriate macrovariables: price, income and
money stock levels. Further, non-quantifiable events did 
at times exert significant influence on the level of the 
exchange rate. It was also demonstrated that the inter­
vention activities of the exchange stabilization funds 
(especially the FESF), was significant in determining the 
level of the exchange rate.
Regarding intervention activity, no evidence of 
"competitive depreciations" could be found; surprisingly, 
the relationship between the FESF and BEEA was one of 
overt cooperation. It was shown, however, that in many
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instances, intervention had a destabilizing effect on 
the terms of trade between France and the United Kingdom. 
Further, the analysis demonstrated that the level of 
the export surplus was significantly influenced by the 
terms of trade. The argument can be extended a priori 
that the exchange stabilization funds affected employment 
and income levels through their activities to influence 
the level of the exchange rate.
In particular, the analysis of fluctuations in the 
franc-pound exchange rate led to the following conclusions:
Whether individually or in ratio form, French and 
British price levels were the dominant variables associated 
with the level of the exchange rate. In an experiment 
with the fundamental macrovariables in ratio form, step­
wise regression showed that the price ratio variable alone 
had an of 0.81 while the full model had an of 0.98 
(Table 4-5, Chapter IV). These findings lend strong 
support to the purchasing-power-parity theory which holds 
that the primary determinant of a change in the exchange 
rate is a change of the relative price levels in the 
two countries.
Income levels in the two countries in ratio form 
had a significant effect on the exchange rate; singularly, 
only the French income level was significant. This evidence 
lends support to the theoretical notion that the marginal
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propensity to import is significant and positive (i.e. 
the income elasticity of demand for imports is positive).
The other macrovariables tested--money stocks and 
interest rate differentials--produced mixed results. 
Individually, neither French nor British money stocks 
significantly influenced the exchange rate, yet in ratio 
form the variable was significant. This writer offers 
no explanation for this curious occurrence. For the 
individual money stock variables, the high partial corre­
lation with price levels left the possibility that the 
price variables may have reflected some influence belonging 
to money stocks. Interest rate differentials were never 
significant. This result was expected, based on an exam­
ination of the Bank of France's discount policy: In
response to capital flows which influenced the franc- 
pound rate, the Bank adjusted the discount rate in an 
attempt to attract investment funds. At these times, 
the riskiness of yields on franc-denominated assets 
increased, which to some extent offset the interest rate 
incentive and funds did not necessarily flow to the higher 
interest rate. Although it could not be substantiated 
by empirical test, the discount on the forward franc 
probably acted as a deterrent to short-term capital flows. 
The dominant impression given in the contemporary financial 
literature was that the forward franc was usually selling 
below the spot franc. Thus investors who wished to hedge
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short-term French investments would not find the higher 
French interest rate, by itself, a sufficient incentive 
to send funds to France.
Several non-quantifiable events were tested to deter­
mine their effect on the franc-pound rate. Since a number 
of events did appear significant, it was concluded that 
the franc did have a certain degree of underlying insta­
bility relative to the pound and the dollar. The franc- 
pound rate, while generally responding to broad moves 
in macrovariables, was subject to several flights of 
funds and speculative attacks. For this reason, one 
cannot conclude from this episode that macrovariables 
were the only determinants of the exchange rate level.
The analysis of the stabilization funds was the 
major subcategory of this study. The empirical analysis 
contained in Chapter IV suggests that the FESF signifi­
cantly influenced the exchange rate, while the BEEA did 
not. This is supportive of claims that the BEEA acted 
only to smooth out undue fluctuations in the exchange 
rate, but not to resist changes resulting from fundamental 
economic forces. On the other hand, the FESF attempted 
to maintain the franc-pound rate within bands and thus 
on occasion was called on to resist changes due to funda­
mentals. The significance of the variable representing 
FESF activity suggests that the Fund did in fact act to 
resist movements in macrovariables.
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A week-by-week analysis of exchange market activity 
failed to produce a single example of competitive behavior 
involving the two stabilization funds. On the contrary, 
there were many occasions when both funds were active 
simultaneously and they acted in a spirit of cooperation.
No support could be found for the claim that the BEEA 
and FESF engaged in "competitive depreciation."
The effect of the funds' activity on the terms of 
trade was also investigated. The results showed that to 
a large degree, the funds’ activity produced destabilizing 
movements in the terms of trade. Using three separate 
criteria to evaluate the performance of the BEEA and FESF, 
the results were strikingly similar--by focusing narrowly 
on the exchange rate, the funds contributed to movements 
in the terms of trade away from "normal" levels.
The influence of the terms of trade on the export 
surplus of France (with the United Kingdom) was subjected 
to an empirical test and the results confirmed the theoret­
ical expectations: Broad movements in the export surplus
were associated with changes in the terms of trade. 
Extending this analysis, it can be concluded that employ­
ment (and income and production) levels in France and 
Britain were influenced by the activity of the two funds 
even if one assumed that their intent was only to manipu­
late the exchange rate. Because of the lag in compiling 
and reporting information on macrovariables which
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influenced the exchange rate, the funds could not have 
known whether a given exchange rate movement was reflecting 
(a) a movement in macrovariables, (b) a flight of capital 
and/or speculative attack or (c) some combination of (a) 
and (b). With regard to the effects their activity had 
on events other than those occurring in the exchange 
market, the exchange stabilization funds "operated in 
the dark."
What are the lessons to be learned from this episode 
involving managed exchange rates?
Regarding Floating Exchange Rates
When exchange rates are allowed to float, subject 
to the forces of supply and demand, they tend to follow 
rather faithfully broad swings in macrovariables--especi- 
ally relative price levels. This supports basic economic 
theory regarding floating exchange rate behavior.
Implied above is that floating exchange rate systems 
are not subject to continuous, wild fluctuations due to 
capital flights and speculative attacks. On occasion, 
however, non-quantifiable economic, social and political 
events were associated with exchange rate movements.
Including both effects, it is concluded that the 
degree to which exchange rate changes faithfully mirror 
changes in the appropriate macrovariables is a function 
of the underlying stability of the particular country's
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economic, political, social or military situation. Special 
cases can be conceived where floating exchange rates 
would not be appropriate in that they would lead to sub- 
optimal results.
Regarding Exchange Stabilization Funds 
Manipulation of the exchange rate level will influence 
(unintentionally perhaps) the terms of trade between two 
countries. This in turn creates the potential for unin­
tended effects on actual trade flows, production, employ­
ment and income. This basic problem results from an 
information lag. Information which is important (if 
not essential) to managers of the stabilization funds 
is available only after decisions have been made. It 
appears that stabilization funds must first know what 
is the nature of the force they are opposing before they 
can act without incurring significant economic costs.
The existence of stabilization funds on both sides 
of the market presents possibilities of both competitive 
and cooperative behavior. Working cooperatively and with 
adequate information, stabilization funds can smooth 
out undue exchange fluctuations and presumably reduce 
adjustment costs resulting from changes in the terms 
of trade.
APPENDIX A
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Table A-1
FRANC-POUND EXCHANGE RATE (FRANCS/POUND)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 87 .450 86 .063 81 .844 74,.750 74,.781 105,.125 149..025
Feb 87 .719 87 .219 78 .156 74,.282 74,.938 105 .062 153..000
Mar 91,.688 87.. 313 77..325 72,.125 74..825 106,. 156 158.,313
Apr 95..175 87.. 350 77..938 73..150 75..000 108.. 281 161.,275
May 92.,750 85.,344 77.,219 73. 750 75. 375 110.375
Jun 92.,844 85.,938 76.,625 74.,750 76. 156 110.781
Jul 90.,725 85. 300 76. 469 74. 719 75.,781 128.,325
Aug 124..000 88.,813 84. 469 76. 250 75. 000 76. 200 132. 844
Spe 117,,650 88.625 80. 975 74. 975 75. 188 76. 719 138. 438
Oct 98,,850 86.,775 80.,094 74.,406 74. 500 105. 091 147. 000
Nov 95..000 83. 625 81. 469 75. 688 74. 700 105. 250 147. 250
Dec 86.,281 83. 900 83. 625 75. 125 74. 750 105. 125 147. 188
o\
Ln
Table A-2
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX-FRANGE (1913=100)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1931
Jan 439 411 405 350 359 528 636
Feb 446 404 400 343 372 533 631
Mar 444 390 394 335 376 550 634
Apr 439 387 387 336 371 552 643
May 438 383 381 340 374 550
Jun 425 403 379 330 378 557
Jul 430 401 374 322 391 582
Aug 488 415 397 371 330 403 603
Sep 473 413 397 365 332 420 630
Oct 457 412 397 357 342 471 628
Nov 447 414 403 356 348 491 622
Dec 442 413 407 344 354 519 631
cr>
Table A-3 
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX-UK (1913=100)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 193,
Jan 89 85 89 88 92 103 108
Feb 88 84 89 88 92 104 106
Mar 88 83 88 87 92 107 104
Apr 86 83 88 88 92 109 103
May 85 84 87 88 92 111
Jun 83 86 88 88 93 111
Jul 83 87 87 88 94 112
Aug 84 84 87 89 88 95 111
Sep 84 86 88 88 90 96 111
Oct 88 85 88 88 91 98 111
Nov 89 85 88 88 91 98 109
Dec 89 85 88 88 91 101 108
CTi
'vj
Table A-4
RATIO QF WHOLESALE PRICE INDICES (FRANCE/U.K.)
I93I 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 4.93 4.84 4.76 3.98 3.90 5.22 5.89
Feb 5.07 4.81 4.49 3.90 4.04 5.13 5.95
Mar 5.05 4.70 4.48 3.85 4.09 5.14 6.10
Apr 5.10 4. 66 4.40 3.82 4.03 5.06 6.24
May 5.15 4.56 4.38 3.86 4.07 4.95
Jun 5.12 4.69 4.31 3.75 4.06 5.02
Jul 5.18 4.61 4.30 3.77 4.16 5.20
Aug 5.81 4.94 4. 56 4.17 3.75 4.24 5.43
Sep 5.63 4.80 4.51 4.15 3.69 4.38 5.68
Oct 5.19 4.85 4.51 4.06 3.76 4.81 5.66
Nov 5.02 4.87 4.58 4.05 3.82 5.01 5.71
Dec 4.97 4.86 4.63 3.91 3.89 5.14 5.84
cr>
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Table A-5
INDEX OF FRENCH EMPLOYMENT LEVEL (1929= 1000)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 895 869 864 807 806 827 841
Feb 876 864 859 803 807 835 839
Mar 873 868 861 801 813 843 842
Apr 875 871 864 818 819 849 845
May 881 884 869 829 826 856
Jun 890 893 871 837 828 865
Jul 889 896 870 842 826 869
Aug 978 889 899 867 842 828 869
Sep 977 889 903 868 845 831 870
Oct 968 900 900 860 839 830 865
Nov 952 890 891 849 830 830 870
Dec 933 886 871 837 822 832 851
cr\
vo
Table A-6
INDEX OF U.K. EMPLOYMENT LEVEL (1929=1000)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 914 905 966 984 1013 1094 1101
Feb 918 910 973 987 1026 1101 1103
Mar 934 921 985 1011 1040 1108 1110
Apr 927 930 993 1012 1056 1124 1111
May 918 941 998 1014 1069 1125
Jun 917 954 996 1017 1070 1137
Jul 909 953 993 1020 1078 1138
Aug 897 905 959 996 1024 1085 1142
Sep 910 900 967 1003 1025 1088 1141
Oct 922 916 972 999 1031 1091 1138
Nov 930 914 975 999 1032 1094 1128
Dec 938 923 979 1003 1037 1095 1115
o
Table A-7
INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION-■FRANCE (1913=100)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 106 100 106 93 97 101 99
Feb 100 103 105 93 99 103 96
Mar 98 104 104 93 101 104 95
Apr 95 107 103 93 102 105 93
May 94 109 101 92 102 104
Jun 93 111 99 93 98 102
Jul 92 112 98 93 98 100
Aug 121 93 111 97 93 93 91
Sep 118 94 110 95 94 95 97
Oct 117 95 108 94 95 98 100
Nov 114 97 107 94 95 99 101
Dec 111 98 106 93 96 100 102
Table A-8
RATIO OF FRENCH TO U.K. EMPLOYMENT LEVEL (1929=1.000)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0.970 0.960 0.894 0.820 0.796 0.756 0.764
Feb 0.954 0.949 0.883 0.814 0.787 0.758 0.761
Mar 0.935 0.942 0.874 0.792 0.782 0.761 0.759
Apr 0.944 0.937 0.870 0.808 0.776 0.755 0.761
May 0.960 0.939 0.871 0.818 0.773 0.761
Jun 0.970 0.936 0.874 0.823 0.774 0.761
Jul 0.978 0.940 0.876 0.808 0.766 0.764
Aug 1.090 0.982 0.937 0.870 0.822 0.763 0.761
Sep 1.074 0.988 0.962 0.865 0.824 0.764 0.762
Oct 1.050 0.983 0.926 0.861 0.814 0.761 0.760
Nov 1.024 0.974 0.914 0.850 0.804 0.759 0.771
Dec 0.995 0.960 0.890 0.834 0.793 0.760 0.763
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Table A-9
RATIO OF FRENCH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION TO U.K. EMPLOYMENT LEVEL
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0.116 0.110 0.110 0.095 0.096 0.092 0.090
Feb 0.109 0.113 0.108 0.094 0.096 0.094 0.087
Mar 0.105 0.113 0.106 0.092 0.097 0.094 0.086
Apr 0.102 0.115 0.104 0.092 0.097 0.093 0.084
May 0.102 0.116 0.101 0.091 0.095 0.092
Jun 0.101 0.116 0.099 0.091 0.092 0.090
Jul 0.101 0.118 0.099 0.091 0.090 0.088
Aug 0.135 0.103 0.116 0.097 0.091 0.086 0.080
Sep 0.130 0.104 0.114 0.095 0.092 0.087 0.085
Oct 0.127 0.104 0.111 0.094 0.092 0.090 0.088
Nov 0.123 0.106 0.110 0.094 0.092 0.090 0.090
Dec 0.118 0.106 0.108 0.093 0.093 0.091 0.091
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Table A-10
MONEY SUPPLY-FRANCE (MM FRANCS)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 120919 118621 111443 111516 108362 116992 121641
Feb 119624 118463 110915 121508 108141 116123 122282
Mar 117765 120259 112404 113729 110404 116211 126715
Apr 118703 118647 111321 111570 109271 114227 128393
May 117244 117412 109738 111905 111228 113427
Jun 117018 119015 111974 110855 110128 113553
Jul 118149 117524 111711 109060 110653 117830
Aug 115626 116060 114562 112007 110156 108775 116693
Sep 114310 118831 116211 113026 110355 108363 120658
Oct 120611 118402 113910 110799 111407 114226 122044
Nov 119562 188793 112443 111461 109853 114118 119670
Dec 122747 121519 114386 113441 108099 117297 123585
Table A-II
MONEY SUPPLY-U.K. (MM POUNDS)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 1164 1333 1341 1409 1563 1706 1763
Feb 1121 1311 1299 1386 1525 1672 1715
Mar 1160 1303 1289 1375 1530 1674 1706
Apr 1142 1322 1292 1397 1562 1663 1717
May 1164 1336 1303 1405 1582 1678
Jun 1228 1381 1336 1469 1650 1741
Jul 1272 1370 1344 1492 1672 1737
Aug 1239 1263 1364 1318 1468 1655 1723
Sep 1242 1267 1359 1325 1478 1677 1731
Oct 1215 1272 1352 1338 1464 1681 1727
Nov 1164 1284 1350 1355 1481 1687 1718
Dec 1132 1362 1407 1449 1565 1755 1739
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Table A-12 
RATIO OF FRENCH TO U.K. MONEY SUPPLY
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 103.88 88.99 83.10 79.15 69.33 68.58 69.00
Feb 106.71 90.36 85.38 87.67 70.91 69.45 71.30
Mar 101.52 92.29 87.20 82.71 72.16 69.42 74.28
Apr 103.92 89.75 86.16 79.86 69.96 68.69 74.78
May 100.73 87.88 84.22 79.65 70.31 67.60
Jun 95.29 86.18 83.81 75.46 66.74 65.22
Jul 92.88 85.78 83.12 73.10 66.18 67.84
Aug 93.32 91.89 83.99 84.98 75.04 65.71 67.73
Sep 92.04 93.79 85.51 85.30 74.67 64.62 69.70
Oct 99.27 93.08 84.25 82.80 76.10 67.95 70.67
Nov 102.72 92.52 83.29 82.26 74.17 67.65 69.66
Dec 108.43 89.22 81.30 78.29 69.07 66.84 69.08
Table A-13 
% INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIAL
I93I 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan -2.71 -2.27 -1.18 -0.94 1.34 -1.08 -0.21
Feb -2.49 -1.49 -0.61 -0.72 0.89 0.70 -0.20
Mar -2.38 -I.21 -0.34 -0.79 0.79 0.78 -0.39
Apr -2.33 -1.45 -0.48 -0.74 2.II 0.75 -0.13
May -2.25 -1.67 -0.61 -0.33 2.62 0.68
Jun -2.29 -1.95 -1.06 2.83 2.66 1.66
Jul -2.18 -2.07 -1.37 1.12 0.34 1.83
Aug -2.81 -2.58 -1.94 -1.35 0.07 0.05 0.72
Sep -3.22 -2.38 -2.25 -1.55 -0.24 0.43 0.15
Oct -2.59 -2.30 -2.10 -1.58 -0.29 -0.42 0.22
Nov -2.82 - 2.44 -1.53 -1.39 0.97 -I.01 -0.05
Dec -2.80 -2.27 -I.II -1.18 3.00 -0.97 -0.38
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Table A-I4
FESF INTERVENTION DUMMY VARIABLE - REGULAR
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 -1 0 0 1 1
Feb 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1
Mar 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Apr 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
May 0 0 -1 0 1 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jul 1 0 0 0 -1 1
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sep 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 1
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 1
00
Table A-15
FESF INTERVENTION DUMMY VARIABLE - HIGH POWERED
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 -1 0 0 5 2
Feb 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1
Mar 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
Apr 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
May 0 0 -1 0 1 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 3
Jul +1 0 0 0 -2 1
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Sep 0 +1 0 0 0 0 2
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 3 -1
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1
VD
Table A-16
BEEA INTERVENTION DUI2IY VARIABLE - REGULAR
I93I 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 -I 0 -I I 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 -I I 0 0
Mar 0 -I -I -I I 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 I I 0
May 0 I I I 0
Jun 0 -I I I 0
Jul 0 0 0 -I
Aug 0 0 0 I I 0
Sep 0 0 0 -I I I
Oct 0 0 0 I -I 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 I 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 I 0 0
00
o
Table A-17
BEEA INTERVENTION DUMMY VARIABLE - HIGH POWERED
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 -1 0 -1 2 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 -3 1 0 0
Mar 0 -1 -1 -2 2 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 4 1 0
May 0 1 -3 1 2 0
Jun 0 -3 -4 1 3 0
Jul 0 0 -3 0 -2 -1
Aug 0 0 0 -3 3 2 0
Sep 0 0 0 -1 -1 3 1
Oct 0 0 0 1 -2 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00
Table A-18
SEASONAL DUMMY VARIABLES - SPRING, SUMMER AND FALL (SSF)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
SSF SSF SSF SSF SSF SSF SSF SSF
Jan 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Feb 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Mar 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
Apr 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
May 100 100 100 100 100 100
Jun 100 100 100 100 100 100
Jul 010 010 010 010 010 010
Aug 010 010 010 010 010 010 010
Sep 010 010 010 010 010 010 010
Oct 001 001 001 001 001 001 001
Nov 001 001 001 001 001 001 001
Dec 001 001 001 001 001 001 001
00
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Table A-19 
DUMMY, UNITED STATES DOLLAR DEVALUATION
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 193
Jan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 1 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 1 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 1 0 0 0 0
Aug 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Oct 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
00
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Table A-20
D2 dummy, THE PARIS RIOTS
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1398
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00
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Table A-21
03 DUIMY, THE FLIGHTS FROM THE FRANC
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 1 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
00
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Table A-22
D4 dummy, THE DEFLATION POLICY OF THE LAVAL ADMINISTRATION
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t-*
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Table A-23
D5 DUMMY, THE ELECTION AND SOCIAL REFORMS OF THE POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 1 0
Jul 0 0 0 0 1 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
J-*
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Table A-24
D6 DUMITÎt'. THE PAUSE IN THE SOCIAL REFORMS
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
oo
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Table A-25
D.^  DUMMY, THE "PANIC" REGARDING THE FRENCH TREASURY
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 1
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
00
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Table A-26
Dg DUMMY, THE DECLARATION OF RAMBOUILLET
I93I 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 193
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Feb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
May 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 0 -I
Nov 0 0 0 0 0 0 -I
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 -I
o
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Table B-1 
FRENCH "REAL'' NET EXPORTS TO U.K.
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 17.644 -7.345 5.761 9.122 24.511 4.554 24.764
Second Quarter -13.872 -1.957 0.525 11.580 16.728 6.981 9.265
Third Quarter -1.159 5.212 7.114 14.453 25.947 7.017
Fourth Quarter 57.835 2.165 14.239 15.432 19.451 17.162 20.805
VD
ro
Table B-2
TERMS OF TRADE
(Pf/Puk X 1/ER)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 0.0570 0.0550 0.0570 0.0530 0.0536 0.0491 0.0390
Second Quarter 0.0542 0.0538 0.0564 0.0520 0.0537 0.0457 0.0372
Third Quarter 0.0556 0.0545 0.0553 0.0493 0.0559 0.0408
Fourth Quarter 0.0542 0.0573 0.0559 0.0533 0.0512 0.0474 0.0390
VO
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Table B-3 
U.K. INDEX OF LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 922 912 975 994 1026 1101 1105
Second Quarter 921 942 996 1014 1065 1129 1112
Third Quarter 905 960 997 1023 1084 1140
Fourth Quarter 930 918 975 1000 1033 1093 1127
VO
Table B-4
FRENCH INDEX OF LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 881 867 861 804 809 835 841
Second Quarter 882 883 868 828 824 857 850
Third Quarter 889 889 868 843 828 869
Fourth Quarter 932 892 887 849 830 831 862
Ln
Table B-5
TERMS OF TRADE - LAGGED ONE MONTH
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 0.0555 0.0574 0.0556 0.0528 0.0518 0.0487 0.0391
Second Quarter 0.0552 0.0541 0.0573 0.0526 0.0541 0.0480 0.0387
Third Quarter 0.0559 0.0539 0.0574 0.0505 0.0541 0.0434
Fourth Quarter 0.0488 0.0552 0.0553 0.0548 0.0503 0.0521 0.0401
vo
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Table B-6
U.K. INDEX OF LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT - LAGGED ONE MONTH
First Quarter 932 913 973 991 1025 1097 1106
Second Quarter 926 931 992 1012 1055 1119 1113
Third Quarter 910 955 995 1020 1078 1139
Fourth Quarter 921 910 971 1000 1029 1091 1136
vo
Table B-7
FRENCH INDEX OF LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT - LAGGED ONE MONTH
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
First Quarter 901 873 865 816 813 831 844
Second Quarter 876 874 865 829 819 852 845
Third Quarter 889 896 869 840 827 868
Fourth Quarter 996 893 898 859 838 830 868
VO
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Table B-8
SEASONAL DUMMY VARIABLES (S^ = 1ST QUARTER, S2 = 2ND QUARTER, S3 = 3RD QUARTER)
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3 S1S2S3
First Quarter 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 0  0
Second Quarter 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
Third Quarter 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Fourth Quarter 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VÛ
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